

EXHAUSTION: THE AFRICAN WAY OF WAR

A Monograph

by

MAJ Paul D. Godson
United States Army



School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

2014-01

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.					
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 23-04-2014		2. REPORT TYPE SAMS Monograph		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) JUNE 2013 – MAY 2014	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Exhaustion: The African Way of War				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Major Paul D. Godson, U.S. Army				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD 1 Reynolds Ave. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT Africa is one of the most volatile places in the world. The diversity of 54 countries and hundreds of ethnicities and dialects makes Africa complicated. With the establishment of AFRICOM in 2008, the importance of Africa to the U.S. military is growing. With an increased interest comes a need for improved understanding of Africa. This monograph aims to improve understanding of Africa for future planners starting with an understanding of conflicts in Africa. Similarly to classifying the American way of war, can an African way of war be identified? Using the Case Study method, two regionally diverse case studies of Africa facilitate examination of the nature of conflict in Africa. A societal conflict, the Second Congo War in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and an intrastate conflict, the Sierra Leone conflict will test the two hypotheses of the study. The hypotheses state that if the type of warfare in Africa is either societal or intrastate, the way of war is exhaustion. The significance of the study is that it provides an understanding of the nature of conflict in Africa. The evidence from the case studies suggest that exhaustion is indeed the way of war in Africa. Small conscript armies necessitate the need for coalition warfare and in many cases, outside intervention. The size and diversity of African countries mean security forces are relatively weak resulting in protracted conflicts. The small size, weak strength, poor training of forces necessitates choosing an exhaustive type approach that involves degradation of political, economic, and military power of adversaries. This often involves exploitation of the population creating a humanitarian crisis. Outside intervention is required to end the conflict and reach a negotiated settlement. Ultimately, understanding the nature of conflict is critical to successful partnership operations in Africa.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Way of War, Africa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, African conflict					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			MAJ Paul D. Godson
U	U	U	UU	74	19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Name of Candidate: MAJ Paul D. Godson

Monograph Title: Exhaustion: The African Way of War

Approved by:

_____, Monograph Director
Bruce E. Stanley, Ph.D.

_____, Seminar Leader
Jerry A. Turner, COL, AR

_____, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Henry A. Arnold III, COL, IN

Accepted this 22nd day of May 2014 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author, and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other government agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

EXHAUSTION: THE AFRICAN WAY OF WAR, by MAJ Paul D. Godson, United States Army, 72 pages.

Africa is one of the most volatile places in the world. The diversity of 54 countries and hundreds of ethnicities and dialects makes Africa complicated. With the establishment of AFRICOM in 2008, the importance of Africa to the U.S. military is growing. With an increased interest comes a need for improved understanding of Africa. This monograph aims to improve understanding of Africa for future planners starting with an understanding of conflicts in Africa. Similarly to classifying the American way of war, can an African way of war be identified? Using the Case Study method, two regionally diverse case studies of Africa facilitate examination of the nature of conflict in Africa. A societal conflict, the Second Congo War in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and an intrastate conflict, the Sierra Leone conflict will test the two hypotheses of the study. The hypotheses state that if the type of warfare in Africa is either societal or intrastate, the way of war is exhaustion. The significance of the study is that it provides an understanding of the nature of conflict in Africa.

The evidence from the case studies suggest that exhaustion is indeed the way of war in Africa. Small conscript armies necessitate the need for coalition warfare and in many cases, outside intervention. The size and diversity of African countries mean security forces are relatively weak resulting in protracted conflicts. The small size, weak strength, poor training of forces necessitates choosing an exhaustive type approach that involves degradation of political, economic, and military power of adversaries. This often involves exploitation of the population creating a humanitarian crisis. Outside intervention is required to end the conflict and reach a negotiated settlement. Ultimately, understanding the nature of conflict is critical to successful partnership operations in Africa.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to several individuals who were invaluable throughout the development of this study. First, I would like to thank my wife and family. Without their unending patience and support, it would have been impossible to find the time and persistence to finish. It is impossible to repay the love and support you have given. Second, I would like to thank Dr. Bruce Stanley, my monograph director, who gave me the freedom in time and resources to gain an understanding of this broad and exceptional topic. Thank you for your patience, mentorship, and confidence throughout. In addition, Dr. Stanley led our monograph syndicate through a highly structured monograph process that was critical to the success of this study. Next, I would like to thank Colonel Jerry Turner for his endless patience, professional guidance, and subtle mentorship to facilitate my development as a writer, student, and Army officer. His lessons in leadership have made me a better person, officer, and leader. Finally, I would like to thank the members of my Seminar. Specifically, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Hudson and Majors Rich Malloy, Chris Hodl, Jose Vasquez, and John Davis. I am humbled to be friends with these great officers. This study would not be what it is without their peer mentorship, friendly competition, knowledge, and professionalism.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACRONYMS	vi
ILLUSTRATIONS	viii
TABLES	ix
INTRODUCTION	1
LITERATURE REVIEW	8
METHODOLOGY	20
THE SECOND CONGO WAR.....	25
Overview of the Case.....	26
What was the Type of Conflict?	29
What is the Form of Conflict?.....	30
What were the Types of Forces Used in the Conflict?.....	31
What was the Strength of the Force?	32
What was the Approach of the Force?	33
Was Outside Intervention Needed?.....	34
What was the Desired Outcome of the Conflict?.....	35
Summary	36
THE SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT	37
Overview of the Case Study.....	38
What was the Type of Conflict?	40
What was the Form of Conflict?	42
What were the Types of Forces Used in the Conflict?.....	43
What was the Strength of the Force?	44
What was the Approach of the Force?	45
Was Outside Intervention Needed?.....	46
What was the Desired Outcome?	47
Summary	48
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS	50
CONCLUSION	55
BIBLIOGRAPHY	59

ACRONYMS

ADF	Allied Democratic Front
AFDL	Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo-Zaire
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EO	Executive Outcomes
FAC	Armed Forces of the Congo
FAR	Rwandan Armed Forces
FDD	Forces for the Defense of Democracy
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MLC	Movement for the Liberation of the Congo
NPRC	National Provisional Ruling Council
RDC	Rally for Congolese Democracy
RPF	Rwanda Patriotic Front
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SLA	Sierra Leone Army
SLPP	Sierra Leone Peoples Party
SPLA	Sudanese People's Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudanese People's Liberation Movement
U.K.	United Kingdom
U.N.	United Nations
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola

UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission to Sierra Leone
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure 1: Type of American Conflict	11
Figure 2: Forms of American Conflict	12
Figure 3: American Ways of War	16
Figure 4: African Types of Conflict	19
Figure 5: Second Congo War	26
Figure 6: Sierra Leone Conflict.....	38

TABLES

Table 1: Way of War Characteristics	17
Table 2: Summary of Findings from the Case Studies	52
Table 3: Hypotheses Comparison.....	53

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into something that is alien to its nature.

—Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the early nineteenth century, people referred to Africa as the “Dark Continent” for its vast unexplored frontiers and inaccessible areas; more recently, the phrase refers to its lack of technology, inadequate education, and extreme poverty.¹ Africa is starting to shed the “Dark Continent” moniker as the world community increasingly addresses the troubles of Africa. Growing security concerns stimulated by lack of infrastructure, disease, widespread hunger, and growing discontent among the “youth bulge” have energized the world to take a closer look at the social problems surrounding the largest continent in the Southern Hemisphere.

The establishment of Africa Combatant Command (AFRICOM) on 1 October 2008 demonstrates the growing importance Africa plays in the world community and the United States. AFRICOM was the first Combatant Command assigned a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) as part of the U.S. Army Regionally Aligned Forces initiative.² These commitments of forces support the National Security Strategy initiatives of partnership and support for improvement in African security and rule of law sectors.³ To be an effective partner in the region, the U.S. must understand the types and ways of war in Africa. The United States can be better partners by working to understand Africa as a whole.

¹Lucy Jarosz, “Constructing the Dark Continent: Metaphor as Geographic Representation of Africa,” *Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography* 74, no. 2 (1992): 105, <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/490566> (accessed 5 January 2014).

²Michelle Tan, “Africom: Regionally Aligned Forces Find Their Anti-Terror Mission,” *Defense News*, 20 October 2013, <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131020/SHOWSCOUT04/310200014/AFRICOM-Regionally-Aligned-Forces-Find-Their-Anti-terror-Mission> (accessed 9 March 2014).

³Leon Panetta, Barack Obama, and United States, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012). 3: Leon Panetta, B. Obama, and United States, *National Security Strategy 2010* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2010). 3, 39, 45.

Africa's diverse culture, history, and geography give it a unique context and its own distinct way of war. Nigeria alone has over 250 different ethnic groups, further complicating understanding, but proves the importance of the context.⁴ African states have struggled with controlling large expanses of colonial boundaries that encompass large swathes of unsettled land.⁵ What makes wars in Africa unique is the indirect and/or direct involvement of other nations in African conflicts. With greater understanding of the ways that war happen in Africa, the U.S. can be an effective security partner and build the foundation for Africa to shed the "Dark Continent" moniker. This paper argues that the African continent is a poor, ethnically diverse, resource-rich continent that is persistently embroiled in conflict. Conflict in Africa involves brutal coercion of the population, border exploitation, economic deprivation, and direct/indirect coalition warfare degrading the economic and military potential of the enemy as part of the military and political strategy. Thus, exhaustion is the African way of war.

There is very little research concerning the ways of African wars. Most research has focused on specific wars within Africa without a holistic approach. Of the literature that is available, authors argue there is not a distinct African way of war.⁶ Instead of defining a way of war, most discourse is concerned with defining the types of African conflict. Monty Marshall documents the types of conflict as Societal and Interstate. He modifies the more common forms of intrastate warfare into what he calls societal warfare.⁷ Societal warfare takes into consideration

⁴Thomas Krabacher, Ezekiel Kalipeni, and Azzedine Layachi, *Africa*, 14th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2013), 13.

⁵Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 3.

⁶Richard Reid, "The Fragile Revolution: War, Polity and Development in Africa Over La Longue Duree" (diss., School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2005) 24, <http://civicism.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/The%20Fragile%20Revolution%20-%20Reid.pdf> (accessed 9 March 2014).

⁷Monty Marshall, *Conflict Trends in Africa 1946-2004: A Macro-Comparative Perspective* (London: Department for International Development, 2006), 4-7.

the nations in Africa split by arbitrary boundaries from European colonialism.⁸ This is a shortsighted view as it discounts traditional intrastate warfare that may be contained to a State based on ideology such as the Mozambique and Zimbabwe Civil War. Generally, intra-state conflicts involving coups, insurgencies, and proxy wars characterize African conflicts. Other nations, both within and outside of Africa, influence these conflicts determined by their interests. Unless the U.S. understands the operational environment it is operating in, the U.S. will not be able to operate effectively nor prepare our partners for security missions.⁹

The purpose of this study is to explore whether there is a way of war unique to Africa. Identifying a way of war in Africa will create a deeper understanding and give clarity to the complex intrastate conflicts in Africa. In addition, understanding the nature of war is critical to developing an effective strategy. A second purpose of this study is to consider the implications of the types of war within Africa. The types of war give further understanding to the conflict. The goals will enable better contextual understanding and understanding the underlying conditions on the battlefield.

The significance of this study is that it identifies the commonalities and differences between conflicts in Africa. This study supports the National Security Strategy objectives of effective partnership and bringing Africa into the global community.¹⁰ It is significant because of the growing importance of Africa to the world community and the United States (U.S.). Africa's growing population will continue to compete for scarce resources on the continent potentially creating humanitarian crises and other security concerns. The large youth bulge in the urban areas

⁸Marshall, *Conflict Trends in Africa 1946-2004*, 1-3.

⁹An operational environment is “a composite of conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Publication(JP) 1-02, Dictionary of Operational Terms and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, November 2010), 205.

¹⁰Panetta, and Obama, and United States, *National Security Strategy 2010*, 3, 39, 45.

coupled with the high unemployment rate and poor education, create instability as more youth turn toward violent extremist organizations, criminal elements, and vicious gangs within the weak security framework of African states.¹¹ Developing an understanding of the problems in Africa will create a better opportunity for solutions to these multifaceted problems. Identifying an African way of war can be a departure point in the discourse in developing solutions and understandings for complex problems. Definitions will give further understanding to the significance of the problem.

There will be key terms used throughout this monograph that are defined to ensure a common language is shared with the reader. A proxy war is a war prosecuted by two or more belligerents with at least one receiving direct or indirect influence from an outside power acting in its own interest.¹² Attrition warfare is a military strategy that attempts to defeat an enemy through wearing down personnel, material, and morale to the point of collapse.¹³ Annihilation is a military strategy aiming to win a crushing victory and a complete overthrow of the enemy using a combination of mass and concentration.¹⁴ Commitment of military means by outside powers by providing financial means or material forces defines intervention. Counterinsurgency is comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and address any core grievances.¹⁵

¹¹Jakkie Cilliers, Barry Hughes, and Jonathan Moyer, eds., *Monograph*, vol. 175, *African Futures 2050* (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2011), 73-80. A youth bulge is the phenomenon of a rapidly growing youth populations that are largely unemployed and end up easy targets for recruitment into rebel or terrorist groups. Countries with weak political institutions are most vulnerable to youth-bulge-related violence and social unrest.

¹²Andrew Mumford, *Proxy Warfare*, (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley Sons, 2013), 5.

¹³Brian Linn and Russell Weigley, "The American Way of War Revisited," *The Journal of Military History* 66, no. 2 (April 2002): 530.

¹⁴Hans Delbrück, *History of the Art of War* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), 109, 423.

¹⁵U.S. Department of Defense, JP 1-02, 62.

This study will use the American way of war theory to determine an African way of war. Discussing the American way of war will give context to how to view “ways of war” in a theoretical construct. Russell Weigley first postulated the idea of an American way of war by focusing on strategy used throughout military history. He identified the American way of war as limited to military strategy. Weigley argues that through the 1950s, U.S. involvement in international politics did not demonstrate enough “consistency of purpose” or regularity to develop a national strategy employing the use of armed forces in the pursuit of political goals.¹⁶ There was not an enduring national strategy regarding the use of force to meet political ends. Weigley states, “The only kind of American strategy employing the armed forces tended to be the most direct kind of military strategy, applied in war”.¹⁷ American leaders instead developed a military strategy in terms of a military victory. Due to the lack of an overarching national strategy in the use of force, Weigley looks at the “history of ideas expressed in action,” demonstrated during America’s wars.¹⁸ Weigley’s theoretical construct enables a methodology to guide determination of an African way of war.

There are two hypotheses that will guide this research. First, if the type of conflict is a societal war, then the way of war is exhaustion. Second, if the type of conflict is an intrastate war then the way of war is exhaustion. Applying the same questions to each case lends credence to the cross-case comparison. First, what was the type of conflict? Second, what was the form of conflict? Third, what were the types of forces used? Fourth, what was the strength of the conflict? Fifth, what was the approach of the conflict? Sixth, was outside intervention required by the

¹⁶Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: a History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), xx.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, xxi-xix.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, xx.

direct actors? Finally, what was the desired outcome of the conflict? These questions gather the empirical evidence to determine if there is a way of war in Africa.

This study has the following limitations. First, this case study will be strictly limited to unclassified sources. This allows the study to have widest distribution to generate discourse and future study. Second, the majority of the sources in this monograph are secondary sources. Third, the scope of this monograph only considers post-cold-war conflicts. Fourth, the scope of this monograph will be limited to two case studies in Sub-Saharan Africa. This enables the study to focus on two separate, but distinct areas in Africa, resulting in a broad understanding of their ways of war.

The delimitations used in this monograph were determined to ensure the relevancy of this topic. Post-Cold War conflicts within Africa assist in meeting this self-imposed requirement. These case studies ensure that the range of variables considered account for the culturally diverse and vast continent of Africa. The large expanse and rich diversity of Africa make it difficult to categorize a way of war. Analyzing case studies from the western and southern Africa will provide broad enough subject matter to deliver accuracy for determining an African way of war. Ultimately, the subject is relevant as Africa is one of the most unstable continents on earth.¹⁹

There are four essential assumptions. First, wars and conflicts will continue in Africa. Second, the U.S. as a global power will continue to be interested in the issues that affect Africa. Third, African governments will continue to struggle to secure their borders creating problems in other states. Finally, analyzing two separated conflicts in Africa will provide the fidelity needed to determine a way of war. The organization of the study ensures coherence in the study.

¹⁹Monty Marshall and Benjamin Cole, "Global Report 2011: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility," Center for Systemic Peace 1 December 2011: 36, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/GlobalReport2011.pdf> (accessed 9 March 2014).

There are seven sections to this study. Following the introduction, the second section reviews the literature surrounding the American way of war theory. In addition, the literature review will discuss the limited research covering types of conflict in Africa. Section Three discusses the methodology used for this study and an introduction to the case studies. Sections Four and Five explore the selected African case studies. The first case study analyzes societal warfare in the Second Congo War from 1998-2003. The second case study analyzes intrastate warfare in the Sierra Leone Civil War from 1991-2002. Section Six presents the findings and analysis from the case studies using the framework and methodology from section three. Section Seven, summarizes the conclusions and presents suggestions for future research and the idea of a way of war.

LITERATURE REVIEW

This section provides the underlying principles of the American way of war theory. The theory provides an accepted model to define other way of war theories. Analyzing the background and definition of the theory with conflicts in Africa facilitates the development of an African way of war. History and theory provide a foundation to understand the American way of war theory. Defining the theory with some of its characteristics facilitates a common terminology throughout the paper. To give context to the idea of an African way of war, the study reviews the limited published writings of an African way of war and clarifies the types of conflict in Africa. Theories provide a departure point for future discoveries.

The American way of war theory is the theoretical construct used in this study. The idea of an American way of war first gained traction in Russell Weigley's 1973 classic, *The American Way of War*. Weigley attempted to identify persistent tendencies in the actions of military strategy makers throughout American history.²⁰ He used these tendencies to determine an American way of war. Classic military theorist Carl von Clausewitz and Hans Delbruck lent credibility and theoretical underpinning to his theories. He analyzed the types of conflicts, and the actors involved to give clarity to the nature of the wars America fought.²¹ He then used his understanding of the nature of America's wars in military history to identify the tendencies of action to identify a pattern of strategic thought. Weigley would later call the strategy he identified, the American way of war. Notably, Weigley's methodology is limited to military strategy, identifying American strategy during wartime focused on military objectives, often unsynchronized, with overarching strategy.²² This theory and methodology has proven resilient as

²⁰Weigley, *The American Way of War*, xx.

²¹Ibid., xxvi-xxiii.

²²Ibid., xxi-xix. The American way of war is limited to military strategy. Weigley argues that through the 1950s, U.S. involvement in international politics did not demonstrate enough "consistency of purpose" or regularity to develop a national strategy employing the use of armed forces in the pursuit of

the way of war still evokes dialogue within the academic community.²³ To develop a strategy or way of war, one must understand the nature of the war. Mistaking the nature of conflict can be detrimental to this understanding.

Understanding the nature of the war is critical to determine the way of war. Carl von Clausewitz, the distinguished military theorist, emphasizes the importance of pinpointing the nature of war. Clausewitz states that determining the nature of the war is “the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make.”²⁴ Without an understanding of the nature of the war, the strategist will develop a faulty strategy. In addition, he cautions not to make the war something it is not and he warned of the consequences of trying to do so.²⁵ A way to identify the nature of conflict is by first considering the type of conflict along with the form it takes.

There are four types of American conflicts: Revolutionary war or a war for independence, civil war, major combat operations such as World War I (WWI) and World War II (WWII), and counterinsurgency such as in Vietnam. Clausewitz argued there were two types of war. The first type sought “the overthrow of the enemy,” isolating the enemy politically through military defeat of the main enemy army.²⁶ The second type attempts to seize territory for annexation or to use for negotiating with the enemy.²⁷ Weigley uses the American Revolution as an example of the

political goals. There was not an enduring national strategy regarding the use of force to meet political ends. Weigley states, “The only kind of American strategy employing the armed forces tended to be the most direct kind of military strategy, applied in war.” American leaders instead developed a military strategy in terms of a military victory. Due to the lack of an overarching national strategy in the use of force, Weigley looks at the “history of ideas expressed in action,” demonstrated during America’s wars.

²³Linn and Weigley, “The American Way of War Revisited,” 530.

²⁴Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. Michael Howard, Peter Paret, and Bernard Brodie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 88.

²⁵Clausewitz, *On War*, 89, 577-617.

²⁶*Ibid.*, 69.

²⁷*Ibid.*

Clausewitz second type of warfare. The Americans fought to take away a slice of territory as opposed to the overthrow or the destruction of the British Army.²⁸ As the United States grew both economically and militarily, it contained the means to focus its strategies on overthrowing the enemy. Americans shifted from Clausewitz's second type to the first as the military grew stronger. The new capacity allowed the American military to focus on the destruction of the military power of the Native Americans during the Indian campaigns.²⁹ Major combat operations focusing military effort on the destruction of Germany and Japan in World Wars I and II, also fit into this category. American counterinsurgency efforts during the Philippine Insurrection in 1899, the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, Bosnia in 1992, and Kosovo in 1999 arguably did not focus on military overthrow, relating to Clausewitz second type. Noted historian Max Boot argues that the counterinsurgency strategy was for economic, monetary and influence, and not a decisive victory.³⁰ Acknowledging the types of conflict help synthesize American tendencies of action. The nature of war requires understanding of all types of conflict as the situation is never certain.

The type of conflict can evolve as conditions on the battlefield change. Following a successful major combat type conflict to seize Baghdad during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the situation changed. The US led coalition was not prepared for the change in conditions that led to a counterinsurgency type conflict. Clausewitz suggests, in order for the enemy to accept the proposed terms of defeat, the enemy must think they have no other option. In Clausewitz second type of war, forcing the enemy to negotiate requires the enemy to believe that they are defenseless or at least perceive themselves as being that way.³¹ Weigley acknowledges that the

²⁸Weigley, *The American Way of War*, xxi.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Max Boot, "The New American Way of War," *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2003): 1, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58996/max-boot/the-new-american-way-of-war> (accessed 4 March 2014).

³¹Clausewitz, *On War*, 77.

“tendency of war is to require that in order to impose ones will upon an opponent, the opponent must be disarmed”.³² If the enemy does not feel defenseless when pursuing the second type of conflict, then the strategy will have to evolve to the first type of war, an overthrow of the enemy forces.³³ The U.S. defeated the conventional Iraqi army, but could not defeat guerilla type threats in the conflict. The conflict transitioned from a type two to a type one. One could also argue that U.S. policymakers misunderstood the nature of the conflict.



Figure 1: Type of American Conflict

Source: Created by author.

As with the type of conflict, understanding the form of warfare also helps to identify the nature of the war. The forms of conflict are unitary, coalition, or alliance. The form of warfare considers the nature of conflict in terms of size and number of actors. Past American conflicts have been unitary, with a coalition, or as part of an alliance. The forms help to identify the types and amount of resources, and leverages available for the conflict. As the unitary actor against the

³²Weigley, *The American Way of War*, xxi.

³³Ibid.

British in the Revolutionary War, the United States was limited in what it could achieve. Later in the war, the American and French formed a coalition allowing them to fight the British at sea and on land, leading to one of the final British defeats at Yorktown. A coalition eventually led to American independence, which was unattainable as a unitary actor.³⁴ The French and British Alliance failed to make gains on the Western Front in WWI. The addition of U.S. resources enabled the Allies to overthrow the German forces and achieve an unsteady peace at the treaty of Versailles.³⁵ The forms of American warfare add further understanding to determine a way of war.




Figure 2: Forms of American Conflict

Source: Created by author.

A way of war becomes identifiable from an evaluation of military history. An appreciation of the types and forms of warfare allows us to understand the nature of the war. The way of war emerges from an assessment of the nature of war and military history. To determine

³⁴Weigley, *The American Way of War*, 37.

³⁵Weigley, *The American Way of War*, 200.

the American way of war, Weigley analyzed the tendencies of actions during the times of American military use to determine the way of war.³⁶ P. K. Gautam, a noted researcher from the Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, agrees that, “there is a connection between the conceptual and practical application of a way of war.”³⁷ Gautam argues that a way of war is identifiable through a study of the country’s historical use of force, traditions, and cultural norms.³⁸ He expands on the American way of war theory that military commanders often use cultural ways of war as a point of departure when planning their strategy. He argues the cultural way of war is the baseline on which the commander may alter based on the changing conditions in an operational environment.³⁹ History, observation of tendencies, and identification of the nature of war assist in developing a way of war theory. There are several accepted American ways of war in the academic community.

Four historical military strategies commonly describe the American way of war. Military history scholars commonly refer to four strategy-based tendencies as the American ways of war. These are attrition, annihilation, exhaustion, and maneuver. Each way of war has certain characteristics that separate it from the others, providing a common language throughout the study. The study will examine attrition first.

Attrition warfare is a military strategy that attempts to defeat an enemy through wearing down personnel, material, and morale to the point of collapse.⁴⁰ Attritional warfare uses an indirect approach. This strategy requires a stronger force to wear down the enemy force in men

³⁶Ibid., xx.

³⁷P.K. Gautam, “Ways of Warfare and Strategic Culture,” *Defense and Security Analysis* 25, no. 4 (December 2009): 414-15.

³⁸P.K. Gautam, “Ways of Warfare and Strategic Culture,” 414-15.

³⁹U.S. Department of Defense, JP 1-02, *Dictionary Terms of Military and Associated Terms*, 205. An operational environment is defined as “a composite of conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.

⁴⁰Linn and Weigley, “The American Way of War Revisited,” 504.

and material. Historically speaking the desired outcome for attritional warfare has been unconditional surrender. A coalition or alliance is typically associated with this type of warfare due to the need for a stronger force. WWI is an example of attrition warfare. It contained large conscript armies, with an alliance aiming to wear down the enemy in terms of men and material. The Allies had the stronger force once the U.S. entered the war. The outcome desired of both sides was unconditional surrender.⁴¹ Annihilation is another way of war.

The annihilation way of war aims to win a crushing victory, and completely overthrow the enemy using a combination of mass and concentration.⁴² A stronger, conscript force, directly targeting the main enemy force, characterizes annihilation warfare. The desired outcome of the war is unconditional surrender. An ally or a coalition is usually required. Weigley argued that General Grant's strategy was annihilation during the Civil War. He used large concentrations of conscripts to defeat his adversary at Vicksburg, and then against General Lee later in the war.⁴³ Exhaustion is the next way of war.

The exhaustion way of war seeks to use a relatively weaker force to delay decisive action. Additionally, it attempts to wear down an opponent's military, economic, and political power by such means as raids, guerilla war, terrorism, or international pressure.⁴⁴ A strategy of exhaustion "is employed by a strategists whose means are not great enough to permit pursuit of the direct overthrow of the enemy and resorts to an indirect approach."⁴⁵ Weigley argued, until the Civil War, the American military forces were relatively weak, which necessitated an exhaustion style

⁴¹Linn and Weigley, "The American Way of War Revisited," 510.

⁴²Delbrück, *History of the Art of War*, 109, 423.

⁴³Weigley, *The American Way of War*, 145-151.

⁴⁴Linn and Weigley, "The American Way of War Revisited," 506.

⁴⁵Weigley, *The American Way of War*, xxii.

of war.⁴⁶ American strategy resulted from a lack of resources, and a relatively weaker conscript army seeking to achieve a negotiated settlement. Weigley used the American Revolution as an example of exhaustion, arguing the smaller American Army drew the British Army into the interior, away from their bases of supply, to help win the war.⁴⁷ The Americans were not trying to defeat the main British force. They were attempting to negotiate a piece of terrain away from the British.⁴⁸ This form of warfare protracted the war eroding public support for the British efforts in America.

Maneuver warfare is the newest way of war. Maneuver warfare uses a combination of speed and maneuver to exploit the decision cycle of the enemy.⁴⁹ Max Boot gives the example of the coalition forces' use of speed, technology, and maneuver during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.⁵⁰ A stronger, professional force using speed and maneuver, to target the enemy decision making system characterizes the maneuver style of warfare. It may require the use of a coalition for additional enablers. It aims to get inside the decision cycle of the enemy to force a negotiated settlement. This way of war requires a mostly professionalized force due to its precision.

⁴⁶Linn and Weigley, "The American Way of War Revisited," 531-533. Weigley's argument was that attrition was the style of warfare. Weigley's version of attrition was based on Napoleonic ways of war defined by Hans Delbruck. Linn would later argue that the definition of attritional warfare had changed to how it is defined in this paper. Weigley agreed with Linn's assessment in a later rebuttal of Linn's critique of the American Way of war.

⁴⁷Rose Lopez Keravuori, "Lost in Translation: The American Way of War," *Small Wars Journal* (17 November 2011): 1, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/lost-in-translation-the-american-way-of-war> (accessed 4 March 2014).

⁴⁸Weigley, *The American Way of War*, 15.

⁴⁹Max Boot, "The New American Way of War.": Linn and Weigley, "The American Way of War Revisited," 530-533.

⁵⁰Boot, "The New American Way of War."



Figure 3: American Ways of War

Source: Created by author.

There are four ways of war used by the American army in its military history. Attrition warfare of a stronger conscript force wore down the enemy in men and material over time in WWI. Annihilation warfare using, mass and concentration sought to overthrow the main enemy force to win the war during the Civil War. With a weaker force, the Americans used the exhaustion way of warfare to seek a negotiated settlement with a conscript force. Maneuver warfare requires a large professional army using speed and maneuver to get inside the enemy's decision cycle such as Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.

Table 1: Way of War Characteristics

	Characteristics			
	Attrition	Annihilation	Exhaustion	Maneuver
Strength of Force needed for the Strategy	Stronger (Usually larger)	Stronger (Usually larger)	No advantage	Stronger, usually smaller
Type of Force	Conscript Army	Conscript Army	Conscript Army	Professional Army
Approach	Degrade resources, man material	Targets main enemy army	Degrade resources, economic, political and military power	Speed, Maneuver, targets enemy decision making cycle
Outside Intervention Needed?	Sometimes (To create the larger force)	Sometime (To create the larger force)	Yes to break the stalemate	Like minded professional armies to improve success
Outcome desired	Unconditional Surrender	Unconditional Surrender	Negotiated Settlement	Negotiated Settlement

Source: Created by author.

There is surprisingly little in the existing literature that defines an African way of war. However, several works attempt to define the types of conflict found in Africa. Generally, the scholars agree that there are three types of conflict within Africa. Interstate warfare, intrastate warfare, and a hybrid type called societal warfare. The discussion of interstate warfare centers on border conflicts and wars of independence. Intrastate warfare concerns civil wars and secessionist movements. Societal warfare is a hybrid type of warfare that includes ethnic warfare and extra-state warfare. Understanding the types of warfare in Africa, along with the external and internal participants, allows an understanding of the nature of the war, and, therefore, the way of war in Africa.

Interstate conflict in Africa historically occurs less frequently. Interstate conflicts are wars of independence or border confrontations. There were many wars of independence in Africa following decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s.⁵¹ Since that time, the Eritrean war of

⁵¹Monty Marshall, *Conflict Trends in Africa 1946-2004*, 6.

independence from Ethiopia ending in 1991 is the only major interstate conflict that involved large amounts of conventional military forces. Border wars consist of a long duration of small-scale skirmishes over a piece of terrain. The Libya-Chad conflict that raged over the Aouzou strip in the 1980s is typical of border wars.⁵² Most African wars happen within the state itself.

Intrastate warfare consists of civil wars and secessionist rebellions. The Mozambique Civil War is an example of civil war in Africa⁵³ After gaining its independence from Portugal, the country descended into a civil war between the political parties, Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) from 1976-1992.⁵⁴ Likewise, the creation of South Sudan resulted from a decades-long secessionist conflict starting in the mid-1950s.⁵⁵ Societal conflict is the last type of African war.

Societal conflict is a variation of intrastate conflict. Arbitrary boundaries, drawn by colonial powers, split many societies among African countries. These boundary areas are often uncontrolled by the governments responsible for them.⁵⁶ Governments are limited to action within the boundary, and exploited by ethnic groups. Societies exploit the area they control on both sides of a border for their own gain. The conflict within the DRC is an example of societal conflict involving ethnic groups. The attempt to combat the Lord's Resistance Army is an example of

⁵²Francis Ikome, "Africa's International Borders as Potential Sources of Conflict and Future Threats to Peace and Security," *Institute for Security Studies* (May 2012): 14, <http://www.issafrica.org/publications/papers/africas-international-borders-as-potential-sources-of-conflict-and-future-threats-to-peace-and-security> (accessed 9 March 2014).

⁵³Richard Jackson, *Violent Internal Conflict and the African State: Towards a Framework of Analysis*, in the Cadair Aberystwyth University Open Air Repository, <http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/handle/2160/1953/Jackson,+Violent+Internal+Conflict+and+the+African+State.pdf?sequence=1> (accessed 9 March 2014).

⁵⁴Jackson, *Violent Internal Conflict and the African State*, 4.

⁵⁵Abdalla Bujra, *African Conflicts: Their Causes and Their Political and Social Environment*, Occasional Paper, No. 4 (Development Policy Management Forum, 2002), <http://dpmf.org/Publications/Occasional%20Papers/occasionalpaper4.pdf>, 16.

⁵⁶Herbst, *States and Power in Africa*, 4.

extra-state warfare. Extra-state warfare is a conflict between a state and an armed group outside the state's own territory.⁵⁷




Figure 4: African Types of Conflict

Source: Created by author.

This section has described the background of the idea of the way of war. The theoretical framework will give foundation to the purpose of this study and facilitate identification of a way of war in Africa. The different ways of warfare will guide the study to ensure there is a common understanding throughout the study. The types of African conflict allow a greater understanding of Africa and its types of conflict.

⁵⁷HSR Group, "Security Statistics in Africa Definitions," <http://www.hsrgroup.org/our-work/security-stats/Definitions.aspx>, 1.

METHODOLOGY

Determining an African way of war requires a diverse sampling of conflicts across Africa, coupled with a deliberate process of analysis. Researching regional African case studies will enable determination of an African way of war. Expanding the study beyond a single case study ensures the findings are not limited to one conflict in Africa. The purpose of this section is to describe the methodology used to analyze the African way of war. First, this study will use the case study method. Second, structured, focused comparison will facilitate structure and logic. Third, the Second Congo War and the Sierra Leone conflict case studies provide the data for the study. Finally, many of the sources will be secondary due to the limited research in African conflict.

This study uses the case study method. The case study technique is a detailed examination of a snapshot in history facilitating the explanation of specific events.⁵⁸ It provides a method to discover and gain understanding to a focused area of study. Focusing on specific events create additional clarity to identify the conditions and the frequency in which specific outcomes occur.⁵⁹ Additionally, new variables and hypotheses may emerge, giving greater credibility and explanation to the study. Cross-case comparisons of multiple cases within a single study, further validates the findings among several examples.

The methodology used in this monograph will follow the Structured Focused Comparison method as outlined by Alexander George and Andrew Bennett.⁶⁰ George and Bennett developed the method to gain useful foreign policy insights through the analysis of past foreign policy issues. Structured focused comparison uses structure and focus as its two characteristics to guide

⁵⁸Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005), 67-72.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, 31.

⁶⁰George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 67-72.

and standardize data collection. The structure facilitates a systematic comparison and accumulation of standardized data collection. A standardized set of general questions across each case study ensures an enduring structure and logic to the analysis across multiple cases.⁶¹ The questions must relate to the research objective of the study to enable a structured comparison. An appropriate theoretical framework with a specific research objective provides focus for the study. Structured focused comparison will allow an organized, cumulative understanding of the African way of war.

Examining two case studies from western and southern Africa facilitates a broad understanding on the possibilities of an African way of war. The DRC's second Congo War from 1998-2003 and the Sierra Leone conflict from 1991-2002 are the chosen case studies to determine an African way of war. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is the first case study. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a large, diverse, and resource-rich country in south-central Africa. Conflict engulfed the country when the Revolution for Congolese Democracy (RDC) rebel group advanced toward the DRC capital of Kinshasa.⁶² Since that time, the country has been victim to the most sustained fighting in Africa.⁶³ The International Rescue Committee estimated that over 3.8 million people died because of the conflict. It has been home to several wars, labeled "African world wars" because of the number of state and non-state actors involved, both directly and indirectly.⁶⁴ Proxy wars, resource conflict, and ethnic conflict are prevalent in this troubled

⁶¹Ibid., 69.

⁶²Christopher Williams, "Explaining the Great War in Africa: How Conflict in the Congo Became a Continental Crisis," *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 37, no. 2 (Summer 2013): 81-100, <http://www.fletcherforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Williams-37-2.pdf> (accessed 8 March 2014).

⁶³Paul D. Williams, *War & Conflict in Africa* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2011), 14.

⁶⁴Christopher Williams, "Explaining the Great War in Africa," 88-90.

country.⁶⁵ Several interventions by the United Nations and other world powers have failed to stop the violence there. The DRC provides a rich example of conflict spillover in Africa.

The Sierra Leone conflict from 1991-2002 was one of many wars in western Africa in the early 1990s. The Sierra Leone case study is one of several conflicts that involved outside influence at different scales. Locally: Liberia; regionally: ECOWAS; and internationally: the United Nations (U.N.) and the United Kingdom (U.K.) took part in the Sierra Leone conflict. Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, and several other countries part of the ECOWAS community were involved.⁶⁶ Sierra Leone is also unique as it is one of the few examples of British intervention in one of its former colonies in the post-colonial era. The rich resources and the strong ethnic connection to other countries in the region make Sierra Leone an essential part of any examination of an African way of war. Both cases will allow further understanding of an African way of war.

Standardized questions for each case study will enable further analysis for the case of an African way of war. These questions must reflect the theoretical perspective and research objectives of the study. This is essential to a balanced study of case studies.⁶⁷ The questions focus on the context of each conflict to bring together a holistic understanding of a way of war. The questions enable a cumulative understanding of a way of war unique to Africa. The following questions will facilitate a comparison of the findings from the case studies:

⁶⁵ICG Democratic Republic of Congo, "Report No 4: Africa's Seven-Nation War" *International Crisis Group*, (21 May 1999), <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/004-africas-seven-nation-war.aspx>, 10 (accessed 8 March 2014).

⁶⁶Larry J. Woods and Timothy R. Reese, *Long War Series Occasional Paper*, vol. 28, *Military Interventions in Sierra Leone: Lessons from a Failed State* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 2008), 18, 29, 39, 75.

⁶⁷George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, 71.

- 1) What was the type of conflict? The type of conflict will assist with understanding the nature of the war. Interstate, Intrastate, and Societal warfare characterize the types of conflicts in Africa.
- 2) What is the form of conflict? The form of warfare enables understanding of the nature of the war in conjunction with the types. The forms of war in Africa are unitary, coalition, or alliance.
- 3) What were the types of force used in the conflict? The type of force can be either a conscript force or a professional force. Most western armies would characterize a professional force that is all-volunteer, and has a mature, professional education system.
- 4) What was the strength of the force? Analyzing the strength of force enables understanding of who has the advantage in military power during the conflict.
- 5) What was the approach? The approach of the force is the method the actor used to achieve its desired outcome.
- 6) Was outside intervention required? If outside intervention was involved, the way of war could change and the results of the study may be imprecise. As other actors enter the conflict, their interests may modify the desired outcome, the approach etc.
- 7) What was the desired outcome of the conflict? The outcome desired is either a negotiated settlement or unconditional surrender. Observations from American history and Weigley's analysis would seem to suggest that if the way is either attrition or annihilation, the desired outcome was unconditional surrender. If the way of war was exhaustion or maneuver, the desired outcome was a negotiated settlement.

Books, professional studies, and professional journals will provide the data for analysis of this monograph. The books will be targeted by subject to provide background and informative data needed to conduct an analysis of the selected cases. Books and professional journals will also

provide the foundation for the theoretical idea of a way of war. Professional journals and studies will aid in developing the idea of a way of war. They will also facilitate case study analysis as well as the final analysis of this study. Multiple texts for each case will provide accuracy and credence to the study, which will enable greater understanding of the subject in question.

This section outlined the framework used to achieve the purpose of this study. The DRC and Sierra Leone cases studies allow a general comprehension of ways of war in this vast continent. The questions and structure of the study facilitates a disciplined approach to analysis of the case studies. This methodology allows a contextual understanding of Africa and its way of war.

“There has rarely been a successful experiment in building an insurgency in the Congo from the ground up without outside help”
—Jason Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*

THE SECOND CONGO WAR

The Second Congo War is the first of two case studies to determine if exhaustion is the African way of war. The Second Congo War is one of many societal conflicts in the Africa. This case will examine if the type of conflict is societal, then the African way of war is exhaustion. Additional conditions favor an examination of this conflict. The Great War of Africa involved nine African nations and many guerilla factions that caused over five-million civilian and military casualties.⁶⁸ Many of the nations in the war were involved directly using their ground forces, and indirectly through proxy militias formed inside the DRC. The reasons for the conflict changed as it became protracted, and paying for the war began to strain national economies. Ethnic differences and regional stability gave way to resource exploitation and financial gain. Christopher Williams summarized conflict in the DRC best, “Modern conflict in the DRC is complicated.”⁶⁹ This case study uses four steps to explain and analyze the Second Congo War. Following the introduction, an overview provides key events and context of the Second Congo War from 1998-2003. Next, focused analyses of the standardized questions provide a focused analysis of the case study. Finally, a short summary concludes this section.

⁶⁸Joe Bavier, “Congo War-Driven Crisis Kills 45,000 a Month: Study,” *Reuters* 22 January 2008, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/01/22/us-congo-democratic-death-idUSL2280201220080122> (accessed 8 March 2014).

⁶⁹Williams, “Explaining the Great War in Africa,” 85.

Overview of the Case



Figure 5: Second Congo War

Source: University of Texas Libraries, 2003; Map adapted by author. <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa.html>, accessed 16 March 2014.

There were two Congo wars fought within a year of each other in the late 1990s. The Second Congo War or Great War of Africa began in August 1998, less than a year after the end of

the First Congo War. The First Congo War stemmed from an ethnic conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi's, as a result of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, which ultimately led to a Tutsi-controlled Rwandan government. The Rwandan Hutu fled to overcrowded refugee camps in then DRC (then called Zaire) where they staged a counterinsurgency against the Tutsi in Rwanda.⁷⁰ The First Congo War began because the DRC (Zaire) President Mobutu Sese Seko, failed to prevent the insurgent Hutu attacks originating from the Congo, which led to Rwandan forces invading the Congo. Uganda and Angola joined the Rwandans in supporting a rebel movement known as the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo-Zaire (AFDL) to overthrow Mobutu and install a new government.⁷¹ The First Congo War ended when AFDL leader Laurent-Desire Kabila seized the DRC capital of Kinshasa, and President Mobutu fled to Morocco in September 1997.⁷² Laurent Kabila quickly named himself president, and changed the name of the country from Zaire to the Democratic Republic of the Congo by September 1997.

The reasons for the Second Congo War were very similar to the First Congo War, just different faces. Kabila proved to be little better than Mobutu as President. He incurred enormous debt, and executed violent crackdowns on dissidents throughout the country. Worst of all in the eyes of the people of Kinshasa, he was seen as a Rwandan puppet when their armed forces refused to leave after Mobutu's overthrow a year prior. Kabila began to distance himself from Rwandan support by allying with his former enemies in the DRC government. Due to pressure

⁷⁰The DRC at that time was known as Zaire prior to 1997.

⁷¹Mollie Zapata, "Congo: The First and Second Wars, 1996-2003," *Blog Title, Enough: The Project to End Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity*, 29 November 2011, <http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/congo-first-and-second-wars-1996-2003> (accessed 8 March 2014); Democratic Republic of Congo, "Report No. 2, Congo at War: A Briefing on the Internal and External Players in the Central African Conflict," *International Crisis Group*, (17 November 1998) <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Congo%20At%20War%20A%20Briefing%20of%20the%20Internal%20and%20External%20Players%20in%20the%20Central%20African%20Conflict> (accessed 8 March 2014).

⁷²Mollie Zapata, "A Brief History of Congo's Wars," *The Christian Science Monitor*, November 2011, 1, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2011/1129/A-brief-history-of-Congo-s-wars> (accessed 8 March 2014).

from various political groups, he asked the Rwandan forces to leave the DRC in early August 1998. Shortly after he expelled Rwandan forces from Kinshasa, a well-armed rebel group called the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) seized the eastern DRC town of Goma. Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi immediately assisted the RCD and again occupied a portion on northeastern Congo.⁷³ The RCD with the support of the Rwandans, Ugandans, and Burundians attacked down the Congo River toward Kinshasa with the DRC military dissolving in front of their advance. Zimbabwe, Angola, Chad, and Namibia came to Kabila's aid to defend the DRC Capital, and slowed the rebel offensive.

After initial successes in forcing the rebel forces back to the eastern Congo, Kabila and his new coalition reached a stalemate with the RDC forces, where chaos ensued. The Rwanda and Uganda governments held areas in the Congo controlled by several militia groups, who began to fight amongst each other. In addition, late 1999 saw the break of the Rwanda-Uganda alliance as forces from those countries clashed in the DRC diamond-rich city of Kingali, DRC. Fighting continued between rebels and government forces, and between Rwandan and Ugandan forces into early 2000. Mass atrocities against villages, random killings, massive resource exploitation, and the use of rebel groups as proxies by the DRC, Uganda, Rwanda, and Sudan characterized the period between early 1999 and 2001. On 16 January 2001, a bodyguard at the Presidential Palace in Kinshasa assassinated Laurent-Desire Kabila. His son Joseph Kabila took over as the President of the DRC shortly after his father's death. In late 2002, Rwanda's economic situation began to worsen, and agreements were made for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the DRC. The Sun City Agreement, Pretoria Accord, Luanda Agreement, and finally the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement ended the hostilities.⁷⁴ Unfortunately, variations of this conflict continue to this day,

⁷³"East Congolese Radio Station Broadcasts Hate Messages," *BBC News World Monitoring*, 12 August 1998, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/149843.stm> (accessed 8 March 2014).

⁷⁴"DR Congo: Chronology," *Human Rights Watch*, (8 March 2014).

and by 2008, the war and its aftermath have killed over 5.4 million people, mostly from disease and starvation brought on by the conflict.⁷⁵

What was the Type of Conflict?

The type of conflict during the Second Congo War was societal warfare. The ethnic tensions between Hutu and Tutsi created the conditions for the conflict. The Hutu-led Rwandan genocide was the result of historic tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi's.⁷⁶ After the Tutsi-led RPF seized control of the Rwandan government in 1994, the Hutus fled Rwanda into neighboring countries, fearing reprisal.⁷⁷ Since then, the Hutu used the uncontrolled border area of the DRC as a safe-haven to conduct attacks against the Tutsi government in Rwanda. The Kabila Administration failed to stop the attacks by rebel Hutus into Rwanda as attacks became more abundant by 1998.⁷⁸ The inability of the DRC government to control Hutu rebels operating within the DRC created a crisis for the Tutsi-led governments of Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. Rwanda's solution to combat rebel incursions was to install a new government in the DRC capable of controlling the eastern Congo.⁷⁹ Tutsi-led Burundi entered the war when Kabila started to arm the Forces for the Defense of Democracy (FDD). The Hutu-dominated FDD was a

<http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/08/20/dr-congo-chronology-key-events> (accessed 8 March 2014).

⁷⁵Jason K. Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: the Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 210-233; Bavier, "Congo War-Driven Crisis Kills 45,000 a Month: Study."

⁷⁶George Klay Kieh and Ida Rousseau Mukenge, eds., *Zones of Conflict in Africa: Theories and Cases* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 55-56.

⁷⁷Séverine Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 57-62; Christopher Williams, "Explaining the Great War in Africa," 84-86.

⁷⁸Gerard Prunier, *Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe*, Reprint ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA, 2011), 193.

⁷⁹Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 183.

Burundian rebel group supported by Mobutu in the 1990s and, then out of desperation, by Kabila in the beginning of the second Congo War.⁸⁰

The DRC government used the ethnic divide to its advantage. The government-stoked fears of a Tutsi takeover enflamed sectarian violence, and invigorated the population against the Tutsi.⁸¹ Ethnic sectarianism became a form of patriotism within the DRC. This resulted in widespread violence as the Tutsi rebels were repulsed from Kinshasa and forced back to their eastern strongholds in early 1999.⁸² The ethnic tension between the Tutsi and Hutu caused the societal conflict of the Second Congo War.

What is the Form of Conflict?

The form of conflict during the Second Congo War was coalition warfare. A complex network of coalitions and counter coalitions characterized the Second Congo War. There were eight countries, along with dozens of armed groups, involved in the Great African War between 1998 and 2003. Zimbabwe, Angola, Chad, and Namibia supported the DRC coalition under Laurent Kabila.⁸³ The antagonists of this conflict, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda, initially aligned against the DRC Coalition using Congolese rebel groups as their proxy.⁸⁴ These forces did not act alone.

Rwanda, Uganda, and the DRC government formed several coalitions with non-state actors in addition to direct action with their respective armed forces. Laurent Kabila gave

⁸⁰Ian Fisher and Norimitsu Onishi, "Chaos in the Congo: Many Armies Ravage Rich Land in the 'first World War' of Africa," *New York Times*, 6 February 2000, <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/06/world/chaos-congo-primer-many-armies-ravage-rich-land-first-world-war-africa.html> (accessed 8 March 2014); ICG Democratic Republic of Congo, "Report No 4: Africa's Seven-Nation War."

⁸¹ICG Democratic Republic of Congo, "Report No 2: Congo at War."

⁸²ICG Democratic Republic of Congo, "Report No 4: Africa's Seven-Nation War."

⁸³Christopher Williams, "Explaining the Great War in Africa," 85-91.

⁸⁴Christopher Williams, "Explaining the Great War in Africa," 98-99. As the war would progress, Rwandan and Ugandan strategic interests grew apart causing further conflict within the DRC.

monetary and military support to tribal militias such as the Interahamwe, the Mai-Mai, ex-Rwandan Armed Forces (ex-FAR), and the FDD.⁸⁵ Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi allied with the Congolese rebel groups Rally for Democracy (RCD) and the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC). Rwanda and Uganda heavily influenced RCD decisions and approval for all budget expenditures had to come from the Rwanda government.⁸⁶ Without the coalitions, the DRC government would have fallen, and the Congolese rebel groups would not have had the resources to fight.

What were the Types of Forces Used in the Conflict?

There were two types of forces used during the Second Congo War. The armies of the states involved were largely conscript armies. In addition to conscript armies, both sides used militias or local security groups based on ethnicity. The DRC had an army of 50,000 soldiers supported by another 15,000-25,000 Interahamwe, Mai-Mai, ex-FAR, and FDD working on a mercenary basis.⁸⁷ Even though the main DRC army received conventional military training, they were still a largely undisciplined army.⁸⁸ The Interahamwe were Hutu youth groups from Rwanda that had fled to the DRC after the Rwandan genocide of 1994.⁸⁹ The ex-FAR were former Rwandan soldiers that fled because of their Hutu ethnicity.⁹⁰ The Mai-Mai were local ethnic based self-defense forces, which were co-opted by the DRC government to fight against Rwanda and Uganda.⁹¹ These groups of fighters sometimes fought alongside government forces, while

⁸⁵ICG Democratic Republic of Congo, "Report No 4: Africa's Seven-Nation War."

⁸⁶Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 209.

⁸⁷Ibid., 272-273.

⁸⁸ICG Democratic Republic of Congo, "Report No. 2: Congo at War."

⁸⁹Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 14-16.

⁹⁰Ibid., 190-191.

⁹¹Ibid., 232.

others would act as the police force in their individually controlled areas and sometimes acted as insurgents in Rwandan or Ugandan controlled areas.

The Congolese rebel group, Rally for Democracy (RCD) and the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) were the main rebel groups fighting the DRC government in the Second Congo War. The Rwandan, Ugandan, and Burundi army sustained and directly supported these rebel groups. The RCD was a conglomeration of Banyamulenge, former Mobutu officials, and Congolese idealists disappointed by Kabila's presidency. The Banyamulenge were Congolese Tutsi, most of whom had participated in the First Congo War and felt betrayed by Kabila.⁹² Uganda began supporting the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) several months after the RDC in November 1998.⁹³ Jean-Pierre Bemba created the MLC as a rival anti-Kabila group operating out of the northern Congo.⁹⁴ The MLC operated in the northeastern area of the DRC with military training and logistical support from Uganda.⁹⁵ Ultimately, these fighting forces were conscript or conscript-like armies.

What was the Strength of the Force?

Neither side had a stronger force to gain a position of relative advantage. An observation of the effectiveness of the fighting forces provides the results of strength. Initially, the rebel coalition had the stronger force using a "pincer maneuver" to make rapid gains against the DRC government in early August 1998.⁹⁶ Using a combination of ground forces advancing from the east and an air-supported advance from the west of Kinshasa, the rebels were able to advance

⁹²ICG Democratic Republic of Congo, "Report No 4: Africa's Seven-Nation War."

⁹³Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 225.

⁹⁴ICG Democratic Republic of Congo, "Report No 4: Africa's Seven-Nation War."

⁹⁵Ibid.

⁹⁶Terrence Co, "The Second Congo War 1998-2003," *Modern War* 7 (Sep-Oct 2013): 1, <http://modernwarmagazine.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/MW7.pdf> (accessed 1 March 2014).

very quickly on Kinshasa. When the DRC coalition began to introduce forces in early September 1998, the DRC coalition forced the rebel coalition back into the eastern Congo where the war stalemated.⁹⁷ Tribal militia groups, hired by both sides, continued the fighting to gain control of contested areas and attempt to regain the initiative.

As the fighting continued, fractures in allies started to show. The Rwandan-Uganda alliance fractured early in 1999, resulting in a separating the North and South Kivu province into zones of control.⁹⁸ The Rwandans and Ugandans began to support different rebel movements, such as the MLC and RDC. Discontent at home obligated members of the DRC coalition to reduce their support.⁹⁹ Ultimately, the separation created a greater need for proxy forces. Neither side was able to gain an advantage; therefore, neither side had the stronger force.

What was the Approach of the Force?

After initial successes, the approach of the force, for both sides, became the degradation of the enemy economic, military, and political resources through guerilla warfare and small-scale attacks. The resources of their own means necessitated this approach. The Rwandan government initially wanted to overthrow the government of the DRC through a rapid destruction of the DRC army and seizure of Kinshasa.¹⁰⁰ Likewise, as the DRC government built a coalition, it intended to destroy the rebel coalition army.¹⁰¹ As the war descended into a stalemate, ethnic based self-defense forces formed, fighting on either side of the conflict, sometimes their own. These ethnic

⁹⁷ICG Democratic Republic of Congo, "Report No 4: Africa's Seven-Nation War."

⁹⁸Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 225, 238-244.

⁹⁹Christopher Williams, "Explaining the Great War in Africa," 81-90.

¹⁰⁰Herbst, *States and Power in Africa*, 103-104; Christopher Williams, "Explaining the Great War in Africa," 89-90.

¹⁰¹Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 272.

based militias were hard to control and often committed atrocities based on ethnicity.¹⁰² To sustain the stalemate and fund their proxy forces, the war turned to the control of resources. Angola and Zimbabwe saw the diamond mines in the Katanga province as a way to pay for the war. The Ugandans and Rwandans fought each other over control of the resource-rich area of Kinsagi.¹⁰³ Ultimately, after initial success, the approach shifted to one of economic degradation and population exploitation.

Was Outside Intervention Needed?

Both sides required outside intervention to conduct the war. Laurent Kabila sought assistance from outside the DRC to save his fledgling government. Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia acted on a questionable mandate from a meeting of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), who approved military intervention to support Kabila against “foreign aggression” on 18 August 1998.¹⁰⁴ Both the RDC and the MLC were minor guerilla movements before the Rwandans and Ugandans decided act in the DRC.¹⁰⁵ With the support of Rwanda and Uganda, the RDC or the MLC were able to assault Kinshasa at the beginning of the war and later settle for control of some areas of the DRC. Although each side sought proxies to break the stalemate, international and Western nations pressed for peace.¹⁰⁶ Ultimately, the DRC would have fallen without the SADC, and the rebels needed outside assistance to attempt seizure of Kinshasa.

¹⁰²Ibid., 211.

¹⁰³Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 236; Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo*, 62-65.

¹⁰⁴Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 197. The SADC mandate was made without a Quorum and strong-armed by Robert Mugabe who was acting as the security head of the SADC.

¹⁰⁵Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 205-206, 209, 223-226.

¹⁰⁶Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo*, 49-50.

What was the Desired Outcome of the Conflict?

The desired outcome evolved to negotiated settlement as the war became protracted. Rwanda entered the war for the same reasons it fought the First Congo War: protect Congolese of Rwandan ancestry (Tutsi) and defeat Rwanda Hutu rebels in the Kivu province of the Congo.¹⁰⁷ To do this, they chose to install a new leader of the DRC through unconditional surrender of the DRC government. Rwanda and Uganda supported the proxy forces of the RDC and the MLC. When the initial assault on Kinshasa failed resulting in the rebel groups retreating back to the eastern Congo. Their desired outcome changed to one of negotiated settlement starting with the first Lusaka Accord in 1999.¹⁰⁸

Kabila needed time to maneuver into a position from which he could dictate the terms of the negotiation.¹⁰⁹ He leveraged the interests of neighboring states to gain support. Angola entered the war because it believed Kabila was capable of helping defeat the Angola separatist National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in the DRC.¹¹⁰ Additionally, they felt threatened by the audacity of the rebel airlift into the Kitona Airbase, threatening Angola's isolated oil-rich Cabinda province.¹¹¹ Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe supported Kabila both economically and ideologically. Kabila's government had taken out large loans and sold lucrative mineral deposit contracts to Zimbabwe businessmen whom Mugabe was trying to protect.¹¹² Mugabe also saw a Marxist friend and ally in Kabila, and he saw the DRC crisis as a way to

¹⁰⁷Autesserre, *The Trouble with the Congo*, 99.

¹⁰⁸ICG Democratic Republic of Congo, "Report No 4: Africa's Seven-Nation War": Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 227-233.

¹⁰⁹Chris McGreal, "The Roots of War in Eastern Congo," *Guardian*, 15 May 2008, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/may/16/congo> (accessed 1 March 2014).

¹¹⁰Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 66. Angola had originally been a part of the coalition to overthrow Mobutu because he supported UNITA. Angola had recent reports that UNITA leaders had met with Rwanda and Ugandan leaders. This drove dos Santos to support Kabila.

¹¹¹Prunier, *Africa's World War*, 189.

¹¹²Stearns, *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters*, 197.

emerge as an influential African leader.¹¹³ A shared Marxist ideology and pressure from his friend, Robert Mugabe, motivated Namibian President Sam Nujoma to provide forces to the DRC government.¹¹⁴ The forces provided by Kabila's coalition allowed him to seize a better position to negotiate. Ultimately, protracting the war resulted in all sides seeking a negotiated settlement.

Summary

The Second Congo War is an example of a societal war. The Hutu and Tutsi's used the border to their advantage in exploiting their enemy. The form of the conflict was coalition warfare. No entity within the many faceted Great War of Africa fought without a coalition partner. The forces were small militias made up of conscripted soldiers. Initially the rebels were stronger force, but diverging interests of the proxies forced sponsors to divide the force. This division, coupled with the actions of the DRC coalition, equalized the relative advantage of the forces, creating a stalemate. Initially, the rebels directly attacked the DRC capital of Kinshasa. Introduction of the DRC coalition changed the conditions on the battlefield, requiring a change in the approach, waiting each side out through political, economic, and military degradation. Both sides required outside assistance to fight the war. The desired outcome changes with the approach. Unconditional surrender changed to one of a negotiated settlement as the war stalemated and degrading military, political, and economic will became too expensive to maintain. The next case study examines intrastate conflict in Africa.

¹¹³Thomas Turner, "Kabila's Congo: Hardly 'Post Conflict'," *Current History* 110, no. 736 (May 2011): 196-231, <http://www.currenthistory.com/Article.php?ID=896> (accessed 8 March 2014).

¹¹⁴Herbert Weiss, *War and Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2000), 16.

In under thirty years [Sierra Leone] had moved from a colony of the world's greatest empire to the threshold of failure as an independent state.¹¹⁵
—Charles Phillip Van Someren, *The Civil War in Sierra Leone*

THE SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT

The Sierra Leone conflict is the second of two case studies to determine if exhaustion is the African way of war. The Sierra Leone conflict is one of many intrastate conflicts in the Africa. This case will examine if the type of conflict is intrastate, then the African way of war is exhaustion. Additional conditions favor an examination of this conflict. Sierra Leone is a small, diamond-rich country on the west coast of Africa, home to one of the bloodiest civil wars in western Africa.¹¹⁶ Corruption, greed, and self-destructive policies by successive Sierra Leonean presidents drove the people to an armed rebellion and eventually civil war. Degradation of the governmental institutions, including security forces coupled with the Sierra Leone's lucrative raw natural resources, inevitably led to unsanctioned, indirect and direct, actors vying for power in the savage civil war.¹¹⁷ Over two thirds of the population of Sierra Leone left the country due to the conflict.¹¹⁸ Those who stayed were maimed, raped, and tortured during this gruesome civil war.¹¹⁹ This case study uses four steps to explain and analyze this conflict. Following the introduction, an overview provides key events and context of the Sierra Leone conflict from 1991-2002. Next, focused analyses of the standardized questions provide a focused analysis of the case study. Finally, a short summary concludes this section.

¹¹⁵Charles Phillip Van Someren, "The Civil War in Sierra Leone: Misguided Conventional Democracy and the Clinton Administration," *The Institute of World Politics*, 3, <http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Vater/VanSomeren.pdf> (accessed 20 February 2014).

¹¹⁶Lansana Gberie, *A Dirty War in Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone* (Bloomington, IN & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2005), 6.

¹¹⁷Michael Chege, "Sierra Leone: The State that came back from the Dead," *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 25, no. 3, Summer 1992, 151.

¹¹⁸Gberie, *A Dirty War in Africa*, 6.

¹¹⁹Adekeye Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 83.

Overview of the Case Study



Figure 6: Sierra Leone Conflict

Source: University of Texas Libraries, 2003; Map adapted by author. <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa.html>, accessed 16 March 2014.

The Sierra Leone Civil War began on 23 March 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attacked from the Liberian border into the resource-rich Sierra Leone. The RUF was initially successful as it captured the diamond-rich Kono district within the first several months in its struggle to overthrow the government of Joseph Momoh. RUFs control of the major source of governmental income and poor performance by the Army further delegitimized the government, which led to a military coup in April 1992 by the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). The NPRC initially succeeded in repelling the RUF back to the Liberian border, but by 1995, the RUF was again threatening the Sierra Leone capital of Freetown. In March 1995, the NPRC contracted Executive Outcomes (EO), a private military company, reestablished security in Sierra Leone, and regained control of the diamond mines. Their military success translated into a

negotiated peace between the NPRC and the RUF. The Abidjan Peace Accords, March 1996, resulted in the free election of President Tejan Kabbah and withdrawal of EO.¹²⁰ The removal of EO led to the collapse of the Sierra Leone Security Forces, which failed to meet a resurgent RUF, ending in another coup May 1997.

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) conducted a coup in May of 1997, and immediately joined forces with the RUF to capture Freetown. There was widespread looting, rape and murder by AFRC, RUF, and ex-Sierra Leonean Army personnel throughout Sierra Leone for several days after the capture of Freetown.¹²¹ Due to the humanitarian catastrophes in Sierra Leone, the West African Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) committed the Economic Community of West African State Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to intervene in the civil war, retake Freetown, and reestablish the freely elected Kabbah to power.¹²² In January 1999, RUF launched “Operation No Living Thing,” targeting ECOMOG in Freetown and its supporters, which resulted in some of the worst fighting and atrocities of the war, turning international focus to the Sierra Leone crisis.¹²³

Due to the weak state of Kabbah’s government and perceived goodwill of the RUF, the international community pressured Kabbah to sign the Lome Peace Accords on 27 March 1999. The Lome Peace Accords gave the RUF leader, Foday Sankoh, the Vice Presidency, and control of the diamond mines in exchange for cessation of hostilities and a U.N. monitoring force (UNAMSIL) for disarmament.¹²⁴ By May 2000, the RUF defaulted on the Accords and was again

¹²⁰Daniel Bergner, *In the Land of the Magic Soldiers: A Story of White and Black in West Africa* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003), 38-39.

¹²¹Gberie, *A Dirty War in Africa*, 65-77.

¹²²William Reno, “The Failure of Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone,” *Current History*, Vol. 100, no. 646 (May 2011), 220.

¹²³Gberie, *A Dirty War in Africa*, 120-121.

¹²⁴Peter C. Anderson, “Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front,” <http://www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html>, Sierra Leone.org (accessed 26

brutally advancing to Freetown.¹²⁵ As the U.N. monitoring force evacuated, the British sent a powerful Task Force that eventually reestablished power to the Kabbah government, defeated the RUF, and regained legitimacy for the U.N. peacekeeping mission. With renewed spirit and confidence, the UNAMSIL mission finished the disarmament process of the RUF, and on 18 January 2002, President Kabbah declared the Sierra Leone Civil War over. UNAMSIL's mission was declared over in 2005, and President Ernest Bai Koroma was recently reelected to his second term in office on 17 November 2012.¹²⁶

What was the Type of Conflict?

The type of conflict in Sierra Leone was intrastate conflict. The Sierra Leone government policies favored the elite of the country, allowing resentment to fester creating the conditions for Civil War.¹²⁷ The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) fought the Sierra Leone government in the Sierra Leone Civil War from 1991-2002. Foday Sankoh, Abu Kanu, and Rashid Mansaray created the RUF after they met at a training camp in Libya. The RUF appointed Sankoh as its figurehead.¹²⁸ It did not advocate any particular ideology, ethnicity, religion, or nationalism.¹²⁹ Initially popular, the economically and socially oppressed Sierra Leoneans hoped the RUF would overturn the corrupt government, restore healthcare, education, and redistribute the wealth from the diamond mines. As the brutality of the RUF became apparent, they received less support.

November 2013).

¹²⁵Ibrahim Abdullah, *Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War*. (Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 2004)

¹²⁶Central Intelligence Agency. *The CIA World Factbook 2013* (Washington D.C.: Skyhorse Publishing, 2012), (accessed 26 September 2013).

¹²⁷Gberie, *A Dirty War in West Africa*, 30-35.

¹²⁸Van Someren, "The Civil War in Sierra Leone."

¹²⁹Foday Sankoh, "Footpaths to Democracy: Toward a New Sierra Leone," *FAS.org*, <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/footpaths.htm> (accessed 8 December 2014).

Multiple coups throughout the conflict further exacerbated the conflict, and prevented a unified response from government forces. Joseph Sadiu Momoh was the president of Sierra Leone at the beginning of the Sierra Leone Civil War in 1991, where vanishing education and health services had fueled discontent within the population.¹³⁰ Discontent among the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) raged as the army was unable to effectively confront the RUF threat. Captain Valentine Sasser and the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) conducted the first of many coups in April 1992.¹³¹ The NPRC had as little success as Momoh did, and by 1995, the RUF captured the three most important diamond sites in the country.¹³² Sasser failed to follow up on his promises of multi-party elections, resulting in another coup in January 1996 by his Defense Minister, Brigadier General Julius Maada Bio. General Bio organized the elections, allowing Ahmad Kabbah's election as President in April 1996.¹³³ A new offensive by the RUF created conditions for another coup by Major Johnny Paul Koroma and the AFRC in May 1997, who invited the RUF to form a coalition government. As a result of the coup, the Nigerian government sent a force of approximately 700 soldiers, and reestablished Kabbah as the President of Sierra Leone in February 1998.¹³⁴ Kabbah continued as the President of Sierra Leone throughout the conclusion of the Civil War, and continues to serve in that position today. The war involved a fight for control of the government. Each side represented a faction that associated itself with a political group making it an intrastate conflict.

¹³⁰Chege, "Sierra Leone: The State that Came Back from the Dead," 152-153.

¹³¹"Sierra Leone Profile," *BBC News: Africa*, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094419>, (accessed 18 December 2013).

¹³²Andrew M. Dorman, *Blair's Successful War: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone* (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2010), 38.

¹³³Abiodun Alao and Comfort Ero, "Cut Short for Taking Short Cuts: The Lome Peace Agreement on Sierra Leone," *Civil Wars*, Vol. 4, no. 3 Autumn 2001, 119-120.

¹³⁴Reno, "The Failure of Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone," 220.

What was the Form of Conflict?

Coalition warfare was the form of warfare during the Sierra Leone Civil War. Charles Taylor supported the RUF, while ECOMOG and the U.N. supported the government of Sierra Leone. Regardless of the RUF's savage tactics, they retained their military capability through Liberia, who supplied them with equipment and provisions.¹³⁵ Once RUF forces secured the first mines, a lucrative arms-for-diamonds trade flourished across the Sierra Leone-Liberian border.¹³⁶ The diamonds smuggled through Liberia, supplied the RUF with an estimated \$250 million per year.¹³⁷ This unsettling relationship continued to sustain the RUF, and allowed them to sustain significant pressure on government forces throughout the civil war. The civil war finally ended after the International Community worked to close down the illegal diamond trade.¹³⁸

The International Community pressured Kabbah to sign the Lome Peace Accord in July 1999, accepting RUF disarmament, general amnesty, and the acceptance of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).¹³⁹ UNAMSIL's primary mission was to oversee the disarmament of the RUF fighters. As the UNAMSIL started to enlarge its footprint outside of Freetown, RUF fighters disarmed them. Several Kenyan and Guinea UNAMSIL contingents were disarmed with one report stating as many as 700 rifles stolen.¹⁴⁰ The UNAMSIL mission was a

¹³⁵Chege, "Sierra Leone: The State that Came Back from the Dead," 153.

¹³⁶Ibid.

¹³⁷Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa*, 82.

¹³⁸Woods and Reese, *Military Interventions in Sierra Leone*, 12.

¹³⁹UNOMSIL was the first U.N. mission, which was strictly an observer mission. It was a failed attempt by the UN to gain control of the brutal civil war. To read more about the differences refer to Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2010), 209-225; *United Nations Security Resolution 1181* (1998), 13 July 1998, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/203/28/PDF/N9820328.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed 26 November 2013); David Keen, *Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone* (Oxford: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 248-254.

¹⁴⁰Reno, "The Failure of Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone," 222.

larger contingent than UNOMSIL, but it was still largely ineffective as the RUF failed to disarm. In May of 2000, the RUF, again, threatened the Sierra Leone capital of Freetown.

Britain dispatched a relatively small, proficient force to support the failing UNAMSIL mission to Sierra Leone in May 2000.¹⁴¹ The UNAMSIL forces, referred to as “U-Nasty” by the people, stayed close to Freetown.¹⁴² The British were able to restore legitimacy to the UNAMSIL mission, and helped to secure vital communication links within Sierra Leone.¹⁴³ A coordinated effort by the U.N., U.K., and the Sierra Leone government facilitated the RUF surrender.¹⁴⁴ Ultimately, both the RUF and Sierra Leone had forms of coalitions to execute the Sierra Leone Civil War.

What were the Types of Forces Used in the Conflict?

There were many types of forces used during the Sierra Leone Civil War. The Sierra Leone government had a mix of conscript and professional forces while the RUF relied on forced conscription for their combat power. The Sierra Leone army was largely a ceremonial army.¹⁴⁵ It was a small conscript army composed of some 3,000 soldiers when the war started.¹⁴⁶ The threat of military coup resulted in it being poorly funded and untrusted by Sierra Leone leaders.¹⁴⁷ It was comparable to the RUF in terms of size and capability. Sankoh and the RUF started recruiting from refugee camps along the Liberian border.¹⁴⁸ As the war protracted, he coerced

¹⁴¹Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping* , 38.

¹⁴²Gberie, *A Dirty War in Africa*, 167.

¹⁴³Keen, *Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone*, 270-272.

¹⁴⁴Dorman, *Blair's Successful War*, 115-125.

¹⁴⁵Thomas S. Cox, *Civil-Military Relations in Sierra Leone: a Case Study of African Soldiers in Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 207.

¹⁴⁶Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, *Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone*.

¹⁴⁷Woods and Reese, *Military Interventions in Sierra Leone*, 12.

¹⁴⁸Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, *Final Report of the Truth and*

fighters into the RUF through mass kidnappings and mutilating or killing the uncooperative in the villages he raided.¹⁴⁹ The UNAMSIL force was composed of volunteers from various third world countries that relied heavily on conscription.¹⁵⁰ Executive Outcomes, a private military security contractor based out of South Africa, provided forces recruited from the disbanded, elite 32nd Battalion Reconnaissance Wing of the South African Defense Force.¹⁵¹ ECOMOG forces were a conscripted force from the various ECOWAS member countries.¹⁵² They were a professional force with extensive combat experience that operated in Sierra Leone from 1995-1996.¹⁵³ The British Army was the only professional force in the Sierra Leone Civil War, but did not introduce forces until May 2000.¹⁵⁴ Ultimately, there was a mix of professional forces and conscript like armies in the Sierra Leone Civil War.

What was the Strength of the Force?

Neither the RUF nor the Sierra Government fielded a stronger force. An observation of the effectiveness of the fighting forces provided results of scale. After initially gaining control of large swathes of Sierra Leone, the SLA slowed the advance of the RUF by mid-1992. Equal relative strength between the two groups resulted in a stalemate between the two forces. Sankoh and the RUF chose to rape, torture, plunder, and exploit criminality as a means to control the population in occupied areas.¹⁵⁵ They had control of diamond mines to fund their operations

Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone.

¹⁴⁹Abdul K. Koroma, *Sierra Leone: The Agony of a Nation* (Freetown, Sierra Leone: Andromeda Publications, 1996), 144.

¹⁵⁰Dorman, *Blair's Successful War*, 119.

¹⁵¹Keen, *Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone*, 53-151.

¹⁵²Gberie, *A Dirty War in Africa*, 116.

¹⁵³Woods and Reese, *Military Interventions in Sierra Leone*, 33-35.

¹⁵⁴Dorman, *Blair's Successful War*, 62.

¹⁵⁵Chege, "Sierra Leone: The State that Came Back from the Dead," 149.

through Liberia, and had the ability to sustain the conflict as needed.¹⁵⁶ The SLA was only able to retain the major populated areas around Freetown. The SLA was severely underfunded, and did not conduct regular training to retain proficiency.¹⁵⁷ Even growing the army to over 17,000 troops in 1992 did not give the SLA an advantage, largely due to poor training.¹⁵⁸ The introduction of the EO from 1995-1996 with the combined effort of the UNAMSIL, U.K., and SLA in 1999 gave the Sierra Leone government the stronger force. In mid May 1995, EO was able to drive the RUF forces using a “skillfully executed combined arms operation.”¹⁵⁹ By October 1996, EO found and eliminated the RUF headquarters in Bo, Sierra Leone, resulting in the Abidjan Peace accord in November. Part of the Abidjan Accord required the removal of EO from Sierra Leone.¹⁶⁰ By mid-1997, the civil war resumed. ECOWAS and the U.N. deployed forces to Sierra Leone, but did not have the ability to keep the peace until a combined U.N. and U.K. effort in May 2000.¹⁶¹ The combined U.K./UNAMSIL force gave the Sierra Leone government the stronger force to stabilize the country and eventual peace.

What was the Approach of the Force?

The approach changed based on the means available. The RUF identified their principal goal as the overthrow of the existing corrupt government of Sierra Leone, but their propaganda gave little indication what kind of government they would emplace.¹⁶² They focused on three

¹⁵⁶Woods and Reese, *Military Interventions in Sierra Leone*, 21-22.

¹⁵⁷Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, *Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone*.

¹⁵⁸Gberie, *A Dirty War in West Africa*, 70-71, 76.

¹⁵⁹Gberie, *A Dirty War in West Africa*, 92-93.

¹⁶⁰“The Abidjan Peace Accord,” *Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL)*, (30 November 1996) <http://www.sierra-leone.org/abidjanaccord.html> (accessed 1 March 2014).

¹⁶¹Woods and Reese *Military Interventions in Sierra Leone*, 85-86.

¹⁶²Keen, *Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone*, 53-54.

objectives, crippling Sierra Leone's commercial and industrial activities, undermining the physical security of the state, and attracting international publicity.¹⁶³ Sierra Leone's approach changed depending on its relative strength. The army's lack of discipline at the start of the war, coupled with no unity of effort, led to a failed strategy. The SLA resorted to the same brutal attacks on the population as the RUF.¹⁶⁴ When the Sierra Leone government had the stronger force, its approach focused on defeating the RUF rebels by securing their sources of income and securing the population. In August 1995, the SLA retook the diamond-rich Kono district from the RUF.¹⁶⁵ The RUF's approach focused on degrading the military, economic, and political power. The Sierra Leone government lacked a cohesive approach when it had the weaker force. When it had the stronger force, the approach focused on the degradation of the material and men of the enemy.

Was Outside Intervention Needed?

The Sierra Leone Civil War required outside intervention to end the conflict. The Sierra Leone government was not able to secure victory as a unitary actor from 1991-1999. A brief period of success occurred when EO supported the SLA from 1995-1996, resulting in the Abidjan Accords.¹⁶⁶ This peace soon fell apart when EO left the country.¹⁶⁷ The U.K. facilitated the final peace agreement by supporting the SLA and UNAMSIL forces with a contingent of the U.K.

¹⁶³Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, *Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone*.

¹⁶⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵John L. Hirsch, *Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy*, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series (Boulder, CO: L. Rienner, 2001), 39.

¹⁶⁶Gberie, *A Dirty War in West Africa*, 92-93.

¹⁶⁷Woods and Reese, *Military Interventions in Sierra Leone*, 33-34.

armed forces. British Operations PALLISER and BARRAS in 2000 invigorated the SLA and UNAMSIL, helping to ensure victory declared in January 2002.¹⁶⁸

The RUF forces required the support of Charles Taylor to finance their operations through the illegal diamond trade. Once RUF forces secured the first mines, a lucrative arms-for-diamonds trade flourished across the Sierra Leone-Liberian border.¹⁶⁹ The value of the diamonds smuggled through Liberia supplied the RUF with an estimated \$250 million per year.¹⁷⁰ This unsettling relationship continued to sustain the RUF, allowing them to sustain significant pressure on government forces throughout the civil war. The civil war finally ended after International Community worked to close down the illegal diamond trade. Both sides required outside assistance. Ultimately, it was the U.K.'s support of the UNAMSIL and SLA that enabled disarmament and a lasting peace.

What was the Desired Outcome?

The RUFs desired outcome was negotiated settlement. The Sierra Leone government's desired outcome was unconditional surrender of the RUF. After the NPRC coup in April 1992, the RUF demonstrated a willingness to negotiate a settlement to end the civil war. The NPRC decided it was not in their best interest, choosing to hire EO to defeat the RUF.¹⁷¹ The Sierra Leone government negotiated from a position of power during the Abidjan Accord after defeating the RUF in 1996.¹⁷² After the accord failed and RUF returned, the government refocused on unconditional surrender of the RUF. Due to the weak state of Kabbah's government and

¹⁶⁸Woods and Reese, *Military Interventions in Sierra Leone*, 73.

¹⁶⁹Chege, "Sierra Leone: The State that Came Back from the Dead," 153.

¹⁷⁰Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa*, 82.

¹⁷¹Gberie, *A Dirty War in West Africa*, 70-71; Woods and Reese, *Military Interventions in Sierra Leone*, 27-30.

¹⁷²Woods and Reese, *Military Interventions in Sierra Leone*, 27-30.

perceived goodwill of the RUF, the international community pressured Kabbah to sign the Lome Peace Accords on 27 March 1999. The Lome Peace Accords gave the RUF leader, Foday Sankoh, the Vice Presidency, and control of the diamond mines in exchange for cessation of hostilities and a U.N. monitoring force (UNAMSIL) for disarmament.¹⁷³ Sankoh did not think he needed to surrender, and continued fighting. It took the combined efforts of the U.K. and UNAMSIL to end the Sierra Leone Civil War.¹⁷⁴

Summary

The type of conflict during the Sierra Leone Civil War was an intrastate civil war. The multiple governments against the rebel RUF fighters fought for control of the government without an overriding ethnic divide. The form of the conflict changed throughout the war. The RUF aligned itself with Charles Taylor, and eventually Liberia. Sierra Leone received support from ECOMOG, EO, the U.N., and the U.K. The strength of the forces involved was relatively equal until the professional forces of the U.K. and EO became involved, giving Sierra Leone the greater strength of force. The RUF, U.N., SLA, and ECOMOG used conscript armies. The EO and the U.K. had professional armies to rely on. The approach of the both sides' forces was to degrade the political, military, and economic resources of the other. Initially the SLA choose to focus on the degradation of the military men and material, but ultimately the RUF fell apart as Liberia shut down their illegal diamond trade through international pressure. Sierra Leone required outside intervention to make any significant gains. After the EO success had failed to secure peace, outside intervention from the U.K. and U.N. helped to finally secure peace. The

¹⁷³Anderson, "Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front."

¹⁷⁴Woods and Reese, *Military Interventions in Sierra Leone*, 76-77.

desired outcome of both sides ended in a negotiated settlement in the form of the Lome Peace Accords.

FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

The purpose of this section is to evaluate the cases studies using the Structured Focused Comparison methodology. A summary of the questions as they relate to each case study facilitates analysis of the qualitative and quantitative data gathered in this study. An examination of the hypotheses will determine if the findings support them. A discussion of alternative explanations from the outcomes follows. Finally, a summary and tentative conclusion completes this section.

What was the type of conflict? Societal conflict was the nature of the Second Congo War. The battle lines involved outside intervention based on ethnic ties of either Hutu or Tutsi. Both Hutu and Tutsi using their pockets of influence along the border as safe havens exploited the border. In comparison, intrastate civil war was the nature of the Sierra Leone conflict. There were two sides with different ideological ideas for governing the country.

What is the form of conflict? Coalition warfare is the form of warfare in the DRC during the second Congo war. The government of the DRC had overt support from Angola, Zimbabwe, and Chad. The RDC required support from Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. Similarly, coalition warfare is the form of warfare in the Sierra Leone conflict. Elements of ECOMOG, the U.N., and the U.K. supported the Sierra Leone government. Charles Taylor and Liberia covertly supported the RUF against the government of Sierra Leone. Thus, the form of warfare in both conflicts was coalition warfare.

What were the type of forces used? The DRC and its allies employed conscript armies against the rebels during the second Congo War. Militias supported by conscript armies from Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi fought against the DRC government and its allies. Comparably, the conscripted U.N. and ECOMOG forces supported Sierra Leone and its conscript army. The U.K. sent their professional military of the 1st Para, 42 Commando Marines and the navy to assist the government of Sierra Leone. The RUF depended on militia's to fight. Small forces of RUF

soldiers were able to seize diamond mines and isolate most of the Sierra Leone army to the cities. Thus, conscription was the type of force used unless an actor from outside Africa was involved.

What was the strength of the force? Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi support gave the RDC the initial advantage; however, it was lost when the DRC gained allies. The DRC government had the support of the Angolan and Zimbabwe Air Forces along with elements of their armies. These additional allies only gave them parity in strength as battle lines settled along the eastern Congo. After the stalemate, neither side was able to gain an advantage in strength through local militia groups, fighting as proxies for their respective side. The Sierra Leone government only obtained the strength advantage when it received support from professional armies like EO and the U.K. The RUF only achieved parity in strength. Thus, there was parity in strength of force unless outside professional armies entered the conflict.

What was the approach of the force? The DRC government employed an approach of exhaustion during the Second Congo War. Their poorly trained army fought to degrade the military forces of the RDC with a weaker force. With their external support, the rebels fought a strategy of exhaustion using guerilla type tactics in the isolated eastern Congo. Comparably, during the Sierra Leone Civil War, both sides attempted to degrade the political powers, national will, and resources through coercion over a long period. Thus, the approach in both cases was an indirect method to degrade military, economic, and political power.

Was outside intervention needed? The DRC initially needed to outside assistance to prevent capitulation. This outside help created the conditions for a stalemate where both sides tried to gain advantage. Neither force had enough military potential to become the stronger force. In comparison, both sides required assistance during the Sierra Leone conflict. The RUF received monetary and occasionally military support. The government received support from ECOMOG, the U.N., and the U.K. in various forms. Thus, outside intervention was required to sustain the war.

What was the desired outcome? In the Second Congo War, The desired outcome of both sides was initially unconditional surrender as both sides were focused on destruction of the other's army. As the war stalemated, the strategy changed to one of exhaustion and the outcome desired became a negotiated settlement. In contrast, the Sierra Leone conflict demonstrates a pattern of the government seeking to destroy the guerrilla forces while the RUF took the long view working for a negotiated settlement. Thus, the findings demonstrate a negotiated settlement ended both conflicts. Table 2 summarizes the findings.

Table 2: Summary of Findings from the Case Studies

	Second Congo War	Sierra Leone War
Type of Conflict.	Societal	Intrastate(Civil War)
Form of Conflict.	Coalition	Coalition
Type of forces used.	Conscript/Militia	Conscript/Militia
The strength of the force during the war.	RDC initial advantage; parity with outside assistance	parity; advantage with outside assistance from professional army
What was the approach?	Degrade resources, economic, political and military power	Degrade resources, economic, political and military power; Degrade military manpower and material
Outside actors involved in the conflict.	Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi; Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Chad, Sudan	Charles Taylor (Liberia); ECOMOG, UNAMSIL, EO, U.K.
Was there a desired outcome	Negotiated Settlement	Negotiated Settlement

Source: Created by Author

Hypothesis One states that if the type of conflict is a societal war then the way of war is exhaustion. During the Second Congo War, the type of war was indeed societal. The Second Congo War was a war of exhaustion identified through its characteristics. The Second Congo War involved two coalitions with conscript like armies with neither side able to sustain a stronger

force over the other. Their approach was the degradation of economic, political, and military power choosing to end the war through a negotiated settlement. Thus, exhaustion was the way of war during the societal conflict of the Second Congo War.

Hypothesis two states that if the type of conflict is an intrastate war, then the way of war is exhaustion. The Sierra Leone Civil War was an intrastate conflict between two ideological groups, the RUF, and the Sierra Leone government. The Sierra Leone government fought a war reflecting characteristics of exhaustion. Sierra Leone fought within a coalition with a conscript army. When outside assistance gave them the stronger force, the government chose to focus on degradation of the military men and materiel and a negotiated settlement. This is inconsequential as the majority of the characteristics the government displayed are more in line with exhaustion than attrition. When it had the weaker force, it focused on degradation of the political, economic, and military resources with the goal of a negotiated settlement. The RUF strategy reflects the characteristics of exhaustion. With a conscript like army and coalition, it had the weaker force. The RUF favored the protracted degradation of the military, economic, and political power of the Sierra Leone government using outside actors to sustain them while pursuing a negotiated settlement. The Sierra Leone conflict was an intrastate conflict; however, the Sierra Leone government demonstrated mixed characteristics to its way of war.

Table 3: Hypotheses Comparison

	Second Congo War	Sierra Leone War	Hypotheses Outcome
Type of Conflict.	Societal	Intrastate(Civil War)	
If the type of conflict is societal then the way of war is exhaustion.	Supported	Not applicable, not a societal conflict	Supported
If the type of conflict is intrastate then the way of war is exhaustion	Not applicable, not an intrastate conflict	Supported	Supported

Source: Created by Author

Ultimately, while Sierra Leone demonstrated tendencies of attrition, the way of war is still exhaustion. Acting as a unitary actor or with ECOMOG support, Sierra Leone could only hope to execute an approach of degrading military, political, and military power, due to its inability to produce a stronger force. The additional U.K. and UNAMSIL support gave Sierra Leone the additional military strength to degrade RUF offensive capabilities. Taken in the long term, gaining the U.K. and UNAMSIL support was a political action to gain outside support that eventually reduced the enemy military and political power. The international political focus helped to reduce the illegal diamond trade that was funding the RUF. In addition, the international community pressured Charles Taylor and Liberia to stop supporting the RUF. These factors demonstrate the approach of military, political, and military power degradation with outside intervention, conscript armies, etc. that demonstrate the way of war during the Sierra Leone Civil War was exhaustion.

The summary of the case studies suggest that both of the two hypotheses demonstrate the African way of war is exhaustion. Both case studies demonstrated evidence of a coalition, with conscript armies, parity in forces, targeting of political, military, and economic power, outside intervention and a negotiated settlement being the desired outcome. During the Second Congo War, the characteristics of exhaustion are very clear by all actors. In contrast, the characteristics of exhaustion were less clear for the Sierra Leone case study. The RUF demonstrated the characteristics of exhaustion throughout, while the Sierra Leone government demonstrated exhaustive characteristics intermittently. The tendencies of the Sierra Leone government enabled a determination that exhaustion was the way of war for both actors in the Sierra Leone conflict as well. Ultimately, the evidence establishes that exhaustion is the way of war in Africa.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study was to identify if there was an African way of war in Africa. The study largely achieved this purpose through a broad analysis of history, theory, and academic thought. The American way of war theory with scholarly thought on modern African conflict provided a framework to identify an African way of war. Three types of African conflicts emerged: interstate, intrastate, and societal. The case studies selected focused on intrastate and societal conflicts, as interstate conflicts are uncommon in Africa. The structured focused comparison method of comparing case studies ensured a fair analysis across the two case studies. This study sought to demonstrate that exhaustion was the way of war in Africa by using case studies on two regionally separated areas of Africa. The Second Congo War provided context to prove that exhaustion was the way of war in societal types of conflict in Africa. The Sierra Leone conflict confirmed that if the type of conflict was intrastate conflict, the way of war in Africa was exhaustion.

This study argues that the African continent is a poor, ethnically diverse, resource rich continent that is persistently embroiled in conflict. Conflict in Africa involves brutal coercion of the population, economic deprivation, and direct/indirect coalition warfare to defeat the enemy force as part of the military and political strategy. Thus, exhaustion is the African way of war. The Second Congo War demonstrated a societal conflict where both sides used exhaustion. The Sierra Leone Conflict demonstrated an intrastate conflict where only one side used exhaustion.

Exhaustion is the way of war due to the unique conditions in Africa. Generally, intrastate or societal wars are the norms in terms of types of conflicts in Africa. They generally originate as guerilla type conflicts. Most successful guerilla movements do not have the means to field a stronger army so they need to adopt a degradation type approach. Likewise, African governments generally have weak military systems due to the real threat of a military coup. Many African governments keep their military systems weak due to this threat. When a conflict breaks out, the

military does not have the military strength advantage, obligating it to adopt an indirect opposed to a direct approach. The weak military system creates a need for allies or coalitions further complicating conflicts due to additional competing interests. Finally, the protracted nature of these conflicts and the various degrees of ethnic groups make negotiated settlements more likely in order to appease the largest amount of interest groups. These conditions unique to Africa make exhaustion the way of war.

Identifying exhaustion as the African way of war facilitates greater understanding of Africa. Classifying a way of war is a departure point to understanding conflict in Africa. This study is in no way conclusive. The size and number of ethnicities in Africa make it a complicated subject. However, using the characteristics of exhaustion enables intellectual capacity of future African conflicts. Future planners can identify the characteristics of exhaustion to ensure preparedness and understanding of the nature of the conflict. Conscript armies that are relatively weak are an important characteristic of African security forces as well as a characteristic of exhaustion. Negotiated settlements are a common conclusion to many African conflicts and are an important aspect to international organizations such as the African Union. Finally, understanding these conflicts are often protracted and extremely brutal is important. This acknowledgement may invigorate international actors to intervene before the humanitarian crisis both these case studies demonstrated.

The conscript armies in Africa are not facilitating the government to gain stability effectively. There is a lack of trust between security forces and governments in Africa keeping their militaries small and ineffective. African governments see that a small military force reduces the threat of a military coup. They do not see that it prevents reliable security creating the potential for further instability. Strategic and operational level training from professional militaries will help reduce this mistrust. Partnership missions and exercises AFRICOM is planning will help professionalize armies and reduce the mistrust between the military and

government. Professionalizing these armies now has the potential to prevent future conflicts.

Throughout the study, several additional topics of further study could further enable discourse. A case study comparing interstate type of conflict with exhaustion, proxy warfare, and societal warfare would further understanding of the nature of warfare in Africa. Due to the constraints in the length of this study, there is not a case study to examine the third type of warfare in Africa. There are very few interstate wars in Africa, but the most referred to is the Ethiopian-Eritrean War in the late 1990s. It was relatively short, only lasting two years, providing one of the few recent interstate conflicts, not only in Africa, but also in the world. It also provides the opportunity to examine war in another distinct area of Africa.

Proxy warfare seems to be abundant in Africa. Proxy warfare is evident in both case studies. The DRC government needed proxy forces from other nation-states as well as using proxies to fight in the eastern Congo where it could not project combat power. The rebel forces could not conduct operations without support from Rwanda and Uganda. Similarly, the Sierra Leone conflict may have been significantly shorter if Charles Taylor and Liberia were not supporting the RUF so ardently. The Sierra Leone Government used the EO as a proxy force. There seems to be a link to proxy warfare in Africa. A greater understanding of proxy warfare may enable greater understanding of the relationships that generate conflict and cooperation in Africa.

The idea of societal warfare in the world is new. Monty Marshall writes off intrastate warfare completely and calls it societal. The idea of a society exploiting boundaries at the expense of the government is nothing new; however, it seems to be prevalent in Africa where governments struggle to control boundaries. Could a changing of the boundaries to align closer to societies alleviate tensions? Does societal conflict change by region? Do boundaries strengthen nations and weaken the idea of state power in some areas of Africa? Changing boundaries of African nations is an unrealistic enterprise. There may be a way to harness these boundary

societies to secure and prosper benefiting both the society and the state. The idea of societal warfare could enable further understanding of Africa.

As the quote from Clausewitz advises, the most important is to establish the kind of war one is embarking. Identifying exhaustion as the way of war in Africa creates a starting point for commanders and policymakers to prevent and react to future conflicts or crisis. Poor infrastructure, economic conditions, and disease are the ingredients that make Africa a recipe for conflict in the future. Understanding creates the opportunity to create strategies that facilitate recovery from poverty and conflict. Knowing the tendencies enables future discourse and allows the commander to make the best decisions for future operations. As Clausewitz warns, “Woe be it for the commander who tries to turn the conflict into something that is alien to its nature.” Hopefully, the nature of war will be better understood by acknowledging exhaustion as the African way of war.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abdullah, Ibrahim. *Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War*. Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 2004.
- “The Abidjan Peace Accord.” *Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone*. 30 November 1996 (RUF/SL). <http://www.sierra-leone.org/abidjanaccord.html> (accessed 1 March 2014).
- Abraham, Lawrence. *State Culture and Ethnicity in West Africa: Politics and Conflict in West Africa*. Saarbrücken, Germany: Verlag Dr. Müller, 2008.
- Adebajo, Adekeye. *Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau*. International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002.
- Alao, Abiodun and Comfort Ero. “Cut Short for Taking Short Cuts: The Lome Peace Agreement on Sierra Leone.” *Civil Wars* 4, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 119-120.
- Amanthis, Judith. *Proxy Wars in Africa*. London: Kilombo Community Education Project, 2008.
- Anderson, Peter C. “Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front.” <http://www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html>. (Accessed 8 March 2014)
- Autesserre, Séverine. *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Bavier, Joe. “Congo War-Driven Crisis Kills 45,000 a Month: Study.” *Reuters*. 22 January 2008 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/01/22/us-congo-democratic-death-idUSL2280201220080122> (accessed 8 March 2014).
- Bellamy, Alex J., Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin. *Understanding Peacekeeping*. 2nd ed. Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2010.
- Bergner, Daniel. *In the Land of the Magic Soldiers: A Story of White and Black in West Africa*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003.
- Berkowitz, Bruce D. *The New Face of War: How War Will Be Fought in the 21st Century*. New York: Free Press, 2003.
- Boot, Max. “The New American Way of War.” *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2003): 1. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58996/max-boot/the-new-american-way-of-war> (accessed 4 March 2014).
- Bozeman, Adda B. *Conflict in Africa: Concepts and Realities*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Bujra, Abdalla. *African Conflicts: Their Causes and Their Political and Social Environment*. Occasional Paper, No. 4. Development Policy Management Forum, 2002.

- <http://dpmf.org/Publications/Occassional%20Papers/occasionalpaper4.pdf> (accessed 1 January 14).
- Chege, Michael. "Sierra Leone: The State that Came Back from the Dead." *Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 25-34.
- Cilliers, Jakkie, Barry Hughes, and Jonathan Moyer, eds. "African Futures 2050." *vol. 175*. Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2011.
- Clark, John F., ed. *The African Stakes of the Congo War*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.
- Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Translated by Michael Howard, Peter Paret, and Bernard Brodie. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Clayton, Anthony. *Frontiersmen Warfare in Africa since 1950*. London: UCL Press, 1999. <http://site.ebrary.com/id/5003257> (accessed 14 October 2014).
- Co, Terrence. "The Second Congo War 1998-2003." *Modern War* 7 (September-October 2013): 1. <http://modernwarmagazine.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/MW7.pdf> (accessed 1 March 2014).
- Cohen, Eliot A. *Conquered into Liberty: Two Centuries of Battles along the Great Warpath That Made the American Way of War*. New York: Free Press, 2011.
- Cox, Thomas S. *Civil-Military Relations in Sierra Leone: a Case Study of African Soldiers in Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976, 1999.
- Craig, Dylan. "State Security Policy and Proxy Wars in Africa." *Strategic Insights* 9 (Spring/Summer 2010): 4-27. <http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/institutional/newsletters/strategic%20insight/2010/Craig10.pdf> (accessed 22 August 2013).
- Delbrück, Hans. *History of the Art of War*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990.
- Deng, Francis Mading. *Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1996.
- Derman, William, Rie Odgaard and Espen Sjaastad. *Conflicts over Land & Water in Africa*. Oxford: James Currey, 2007.
- Dorman, Andrew M. *Blair's Successful War: British Military Intervention in Sierra Leone*. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2010.
- "DR Congo: Chronology." *Human Rights Watch*. 8 March 2014. <http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/08/20/dr-congo-chronology-key-events> (accessed 8 March 2014).
- "East Congolese Radio Station Broadcasts Hate Messages." *BBC News World Monitoring*. 12 August 1998. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/149843.stm> (accessed 8 March 2014).

- Evers, Sandra, Marja Spierenburg and Harry Wels. *Competing Jurisdictions: Settling Land Claims in Africa*. Leiden: Brill, 2005.
- Everts, Steven. *A European Way of War*. London: Centre for European Reform, 2004.
- Fanon, Frantz. *Extracts from Toward the African Revolution*. Marlborough, England: Adam Matthew Digital, 2007.
- Fisher, Ian and Norimitsu Onishi. "Chaos in the Congo: Many Armies Ravage Rich Land in the 'First World War' of Africa." *New York Times*, 6 February 2000. <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/06/world/chaos-congo-primer-many-armies-ravage-rich-land-first-world-war-africa.html> (accessed 8 March 2014).
- Fomin, E. S. D. and John W. Forje. *Central Africa: Crises, Reform, and Reconstruction*. Dakar, Senegal: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 2005.
- Francis, David J. *Peace and Conflict in Africa*. London: Zed Books, 2008.
- Gautam, P.K. "Ways of Warfare and Strategic Culture." *Defense and Security Analysis* 25, no. 4 (December 2009): 414-15.
- Gberie, Lansana. *A Dirty War in West Africa: the RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005.
- George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005.
- Haken, Nate, J. J. Messner, Krista Hendry, Patricia Taft, Kendall Lawrence and Felipe Umana. "Failed State Index 2013." *Fund For Peace*, August 2013. <http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/cfsir1306-failedstatesindex2013-06l.pdf> (accessed 8 March 2014).
- Harris, David. *Civil War and Democracy in West Africa: Conflict Resolution, Elections and Justice in Sierra Leone and Liberia*. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012.
- Herbst, Jeffrey. *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.
- Hirsch, John L. *Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy*. International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series. Boulder, CO: L. Rienner, 2001.
- Howard, Michael. *War in European History*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009.
- HSR Group. "Security Statistics in Africa Definitions." <http://www.hsrgroup.org/our-work/security-stats/Definitions.aspx>, 1 (accessed 8 March 2014).
- ICG Democratic Republic of Congo. "Report No 4: Africa's Seven-Nation War." *International Crisis Group*. 21 May 1999, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/dr-congo/004-africas-seven-nation-war.aspx> (accessed 8 March 2014).

- “Report No. 2. Congo at War: A Briefing On the Internal and External Players in the Central African Conflict.” *International Crisis Group*, 17 (November 1998)
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Congo%20At%20War%20A%20Briefing%20of%20the%20Internal%20and%20External%20Players%20in%20the%20Central%20African%20Conflict> (accessed 8 March 2014).
- Ignatieff, Michael. *The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1998.
- Ikome, Francis. “Africa’s International Borders as Potential Sources of Conflict and Future Threats to Peace and Security.” *Institute for Security Studies* (May 2012): 14.
<http://www.issafrica.org/publications/papers/africas-international-borders-as-potential-sources-of-conflict-and-future-threats-to-peace-and-security> (accessed 9 March 2014).
- Innes, Michael A. *Making Sense of Proxy Wars: States, Surrogates and the Use of Force*. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2012.
- Jackson, Richard. *Violent Internal Conflict and the African State: Towards a Framework of Analysis*. Cadair Aberystwyth University Open Air Repository. <http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/>.
- Jarosz, Lucy. “Constructing the Dark Continent: Metaphor as Geographic Representation of Africa.” *Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography* 74, no. 2 (1992): 105.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/490566> (accessed 9 March 2014).
- Kaplan, Fred M. *The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013.
- Keen, David. *Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone*. Oxford: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
- Keravuori, Rose Lopez. “Lost in Translation: The American Way of war.” *Small Wars Journal* (17 November 2011): 1. <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/lost-in-translation-the-american-way-of-war> (accessed 4 March 2014).
- Kieh, George Klay and Ida Rousseau Mukenge, eds. *Zones of Conflict in Africa: Theories and Cases*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002.
- Koroma, Abdul K. *Sierra Leone: The Agony of a Nation*. Freetown. Sierra Leone: Andromeda Publications, 1996.
- Krabacher, Thomas, Ezekiel Kalipeni and Azzedine Layachi. *Africa*. 14th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2013.
- Linn, Brian M. and Russell Weigley. “The American Way of war Revisited.” *The Journal of Military History* 66, no. 2 (April 2002): 501-33.
- Linn, Brian McAllister. *The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007.
- Lucan, Matthew Fox and Ethan Adams. *Civil War*. New York: Penguin Books, 2012.

- Mahnken, Thomas G. *Technology and the American Way of War*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.
- Marshall, Monty and Benjamin Cole. "Global Report 2011: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility." *Center for Systemic Peace* (1 December 2011): 36.
<http://www.systemicpeace.org/GlobalReport2011.pdf> (accessed 9 March 2014).
- Marshall, Monty. *Conflict Trends in Africa 1946-2004: A Macro-Comparative Perspective*. London: Department for International Development, 2006.
- Mbadlanyana, Thembanani. 2009. "Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict Criminality: Challenges to the (Re-) Establishment of Rule of Law in Liberia". *Institute for Security Studies Papers* 190, no. 190: 24 p.
- McGreal, Chris. "The Roots of War in Eastern Congo." *Guardian*, 15 May 2008.
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/may/16/congo> (accessed 1 March 2014).
- Mekenkamp, Monique, Paul van Tongeren and Hans van de Veen. *Searching for Peace in Africa: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Management Activities*. Utrecht: European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, 1999.
- Miller, Eric. *The Inability of Peacekeeping to Address the Security Dilemma: A Case Study of the Rwandan-Congolese Security Dilemma and the United Nation's Mission in the Congo*. Saarbrücken, Germany: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010.
- Mumford, Andrew. *Proxy Warfare: War and Conflict in the Modern World*. New Jersey: John Wiley Sons, Inc., 2013.
- Muzuwa, Tichaona, Andries Jordaan and Piason Viriri. "An Investigation Into the Prevalent Types of Conflicts, Conflict Indicators: The Role Played by These Indicators and How Conflict Undermines the Management of Disasters in Africa." *Developing Country Studies* 3, no. 6 (2013): 29-40.
- Oyeniya, Adeleye "Conflict and Violence in Africa: Causes, Sources, and Types." *Transcend Media* (28 February 2011): 3-12. <https://www.transcend.org/tms/2011/02/conflict-and-violence-in-africa-causes-sources-and-types/> (accessed 6 March 2014).
- Panetta, Leon E., Barack Obama and United States. *National Security Strategy 2010*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2010.
- Panetta, Leon E., Barack. Obama and United States. *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012.
- Polack, Peter. *Last Hot Battle of the Cold War: South Africa vs. Cuba in the Angolan Civil War*. [S.l.]: Grub Street, 2013.
- Prunier, Gerard. "Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare: Uganda, Sudan and the Congo (1986-99)." *African Affairs* 103, no. 412 (2004 July: 359-91. <http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/13951098/rebel-movements-proxy-warfare-uganda-sudan-congo-1986-99> (accessed 8 March 2014).

- Prunier, Gerard. *Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe*. Reprint ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA, 2011.
- Reid, Richard. "The Fragile Revolution: War, Polity and Development in Africa over La Longue Duree." n.d. <http://civircrm.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/The%20Fragile%20Revolution%20-%20Reid.pdf> (accessed 11 November 2013).
- Reno, William. *Warfare in Independent Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
- Sankoh, Foday. "Footpaths to Democracy: Toward a New Sierra Leone." FAS.org, <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/footpaths.htm> (accessed 8 December 2014).
- "Sierra Leone Profile." *BBC News: Africa*. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094419>, (accessed 18 December 2013).
- Stearns, Jason K. *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: the Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa*. New York: Public Affairs, 2011.
- Strachan, Hew and Sibylle Scheipers. *The Changing Character of War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Tan, Michelle. "Africom: Regionally Aligned Forces Find Their Anti-Terror Mission." *Defense News* (20 October 2013) <http://www.defensenews.com/article/20131020/SHOWSCOUT04/310200014/AFRICOM-Regionally-Aligned-Forces-Find-Their-Anti-terror-Mission> (accessed 9 March 2014).
- Tierney, Dominic. *How We Fight: Crusades, Quagmires, and the American Way of War*. New York: Little, Brown and Co., 2010.
- Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone. *Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone*. Chapter 3, para 245. <http://www.sierra-leone.org/Other-Conflict/TRCVolume3A.pdf> (accessed 12 December 2014).
- Turner, Thomas. "Kabila's Congo: Hardly 'Post Conflict'." *Current History* 110, no. 736 (May): 196-231. <http://www.currenthistory.com/Article.php?ID=896> (accessed 8 March 2014).
- U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1-02, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, November 2010.
- United Nations Security Resolution 1181 (1998), 13 July 1998, <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/203/28/PDF/N9820328.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed 26 November 2013).
- Van Someren, Charles Phillip. "The Civil War in Sierra Leone: Misguided Conventional Diplomacy and the Clinton Administration." *www.thepresidency.org*. (20 February 2014) <http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/documents/Vater/VanSomeren.pdf> (accessed 20 February 2014).
- Weigley, Russell F. *The American Way of War: a History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*. Indiana ed. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977.

- Weiss, Herbert. *War and Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2000.
- Williams, Christopher. "Explaining the Great War in Africa: How Conflict in the Congo Became a Continental Crisis." *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 37, no. 2 (Summer 2013): 81-100. <http://www.fletcherforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Williams-37-2.pdf> (accessed 8 March 2014).
- Williams, Paul. *War & Conflict in Africa*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2011.
- Woods, Larry J. and Timothy R. Reese. *Long War Series Occasional Paper Vol. 28, Military Interventions in Sierra Leone: Lessons from a Failed State*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008. <http://purl.access.gpo.gov/gpo/lps104488> (accessed 20 March 2014).
- Zapata, Mollie. "Congo: The First and Second Wars, 1996-2003." Blog Title. *Enough: The Project to End Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity*. 29 November 2011. <http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/congo-first-and-second-wars-1996-2003> (accessed 8 March 2014).
- Zapata, Mollie. "A Brief History of Congo's Wars." *The Christian Science Monitor*, November 2011. <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2011/1129/A-brief-history-of-Congo-s-wars> (accessed 8 March 2014).